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Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement
and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis'
I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to determine which type of antitrust
enforcement deters more anticompetltlve behavior: the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") Antitrust Division's criminal anticartel enforcement program or private enforcement of U.S. antitrust
laws. The answer to this question-and answers to related questions
concerning deterrence and compensation issues-could have
important implications for the United States, pertaining both to
appropriate antitrust remedies and to the course of litigation of
private antitrust cases. Those answers also could influence other
nations considering either adopting or changing criminal penalties
for competition law violations, or allowing private rights of action by
the victims of competition law violations.
Anti-cartel enforcement by the DOJ long has been the gold
standard of antitrust enforcement worldwide. If a country were to
have only one type of antitrust violation, surely it would be against
horizontal cartels, and surely this law would be enforced by that
country's government officials. Even critics who believe that
* The authors are, respectively, Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust Institute; Associate Dean for Faculty
Scholarship, Professor of Law, and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San
Francisco School of Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust
Institute. This Article in part relies upon and significantly extends analysis contained in the
authors' earlier joint work, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty
Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 879 (2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=1090661 (last revised April 27, 2010).
For summaries of the individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Robert H. Lande &
Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case
Studies, http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=1l05523 (last revised Oct. 15,
2008). The authors are grateful to the American Antitrust Institute for funding the empirical
portions of this study, to participants in conferences sponsored by the American Antitrust
Institute, George Washington University, and the Lear Conference, and to Albert A. Foer,
John M. Connor, and John R. Woodbury for comments and suggestions, and to Thomas
Appel, Kathi Black, Christine Carey, Joanna Diamond, Ken Fung, Gary Stapleton, Thomas
Weaver, and Michael Cannon for valuable research assistance.
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monopolization and vertical restraints never or rarely should be
challenged almost always believe in strong anti-cartel enforcement. l
People in the antitrust world disagree about many things, but it is
extremely difficult to find responsible critics who do not applaud the
U.S. government's anti-cartel program. 2 We strongly agree with this
almost-unanimous consensus and are second to no one in our
appreciation of the DOT's anti-cartel activity. In terms of taxpayer
dollars well spent, the program surely is one of the most outstanding
in all of government.
By contrast, private antitrust enforcement under U.S. antitrust
laws gets little respect and much criticism. Indeed, it is difficult to
find many people other than members of the plaintiffs' bar willing to
say much good about private enforcement. For example, even
moderates like FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch believe that
treble damage class action cases "are almost as scandalous as the
price-fixing cartels that are generally at issue. . . . The plaintiffs'
lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the case.,,3
Due to these widespread beliefs, former FTC Chairman William E.
1. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 6667 (2d ed. 1993); see also id. at 263 ("The law's oldest and, properly qualified, most valuable
rule states that it is illegal per se for competitors to agree to limit rivalry among themselves ....
Its contributions to consumer welfare over the decades have been enormous."); id. at 163-97
(Bork's analysis of monopolization and attempted monopolization); id. at 225-45 (Bork's
analysis regarding conglomerate mergers); id. at 280-98 (Bork's analysis regarding price
maintenance); Frank H. Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 Antitrust L.]. 95 (1986).
2. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have made anti-cartel activity their
highest priority. Both have succeeded wonderfully at this crucial task and for this they have
been applauded widely. It is difficult to find many who have even questioned the DOl's anticartel enforcement, except for small criticisms at the margins. If we may use the terms of
professors, it is possible to find critics who give the DO] anti-cartel programs an "A" instead of
an "A+," but almost impossible to find responsible critics grading them lower than this. See
AMERlCAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERlCAN
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REpORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED
STATES 2-3
(2008),
available at http://
www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/l1001 (describing "the resilience of antitrust"). By contrast,
it is easy to find critics on both sides of the political aisle giving much lower grades, even failing
grades, to other DO] antitrust programs. For example, the AAl's report sharply criticized the
DOl's record in the Section 2 area. See id. at 55, 58-59.
3. ]. Thomas Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm'n Comm'r, Remarks to the Antitrust
Modernization Commission 9-10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
rosch/Rosch-AMC%20Remarks.]une8.final.pdf. Similarly, Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges' Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need
reform, and replied: "[ c ]lass actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firms
and not to consumers." Q&A with Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn, LAw360 (June 1,2009),
http://law360.com/competition/articles/1 03359.
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Kovacic recently summarized the conventional wisdom about private
enforcement succinctly: "private rights of actions U.S. style are
poison. ,,4
Given these criticisms, it may come as a surprise-even a shockthat a quantitative analysis of the facts demonstrates that private
antitrust enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct
than the DOl's anti-cartel program. s This deterrence effect is, of
course, in addition to its virtually unique compensation function. 6 If
this article's conclusion about the importance of private enforcement
for deterrence is true, private antitrust enforcement also should
receive much of the praise given to DOJ anti-cartel efforts. Further,
private enforcement should be encouraged in the United States
rather than hampered through new legislation 7 or through restrictive
judicial interpretation of existing law. s And the United States'
version of private antitrust enforcement should be something for
other countries to consider. 9

4. FTC: WATCH No. 708, Nov. 19,2007, at 4 (quoting William E. Kovacic speaking
at an ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where he summarized the conventional
wisdom in the field but was not necessarily agreeing with it). For additional criticisms of
private antitrust enforcement, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 883-89.
5. We will not, however, anempt to compare private enforcement to FTC enforcement
because, except for a few disgorgement cases, the FTC obtains only injunctive relief.
6. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 881-83; Harry First, Lost in
Conversation: The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law (2009) (unpublished draft) (on file
with author). Another goal of private enforcement is to restore competition to markets. See
Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 881.
7. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,119 Stat. 4 (codified
throughout 28 U.S.C.). The Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") allows defendants to remove
most class actions to federal court and, as a result, arguably makes class certification for state
law claims more difficult. Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439,1530-31 (noting one goal ofCAFA
was to make class certification more difficult for plaintiffs).
8. See, e.g., Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (overruling Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and applying heightened pleading standard to private antitrust
cases).
9. In a thoughtful critique of this Article, John R. Woodbury suggests the possibility
that private enforcement, even if more effective as a deterrent than DOJ criminal
enforcement-indeed, particularly under those circumstances-may lead to over-deterrence.
See John R. Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, THE ANTITRUST
SOURCE 3-4 (August 2010), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/10/08/Aug10pTrail8-2f.pdf. He rests this possibility in part on the reputational effects of litigation, offering
as an "admittedly extreme example" BP's willingness to provide $20 billion in compensation
for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Id. The choice of this example may be telling. There is
little indication that antitrust defendants in private litigation suffer any significant cost in terms
of their reputation, and so it is perhaps no accident that Woodbury did not offer a more
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Part II of this Article analyzes the deterrence effects of DOJ anticartel efforts by studying DOJ cases filed from 1990 to 2007. Part
III compares these results to the cumulative deterrence effects of a
sample of forty large private cases that ended during this same
period. (We do not compare the DOJ with the deterrence effects of
every private case filed during this period, however, because we were
unable to obtain this information).
Before coming to any policy conclusions based on this
comparison, we address some criticisms of private enforcement. Few
commentators dispute that most DOJ anti-cartel prosecutions
involved anticompetitive conduct or that most DOJ cartel cases
should have been brought. But are most private enforcement cases
legitimate? Do most involve anticompetitive behavior? Considering
the widespread CntICISm within the profession of private
enforcement, and that most successful private cases result only in
settlements, do these cases mostly involve underlying anticompetitive
conduct? We address this topic in Part IV, concluding that the
evidence suggests the legal actions on which we rely did indeed
entail claims with merit. Part V then acknowledges some
qualifications and caveats to the quantitative conclusions of this
Article.
Finally, Part VI concludes by offering policy suggestions that
follow from our analysis. Our results demonstrate that private
enforcement most certainly has crucial deterrence effects. These
effects are so important that U.S. courts should not continue their
steps to curtail private enforcement, and foreign jurisdictions should
consider permitting private enforcement of competition laws as a
complement to government efforts.

II. DETERRENCE FROM DOJ ANTI-CARTEL CASES
The DOJ Antitrust Division can attempt to deter illegal cartel
activity in several ways. First, it can request that courts fine the
corporations involved. Second, it can request that the most culpable

directly relevant example to make his point. More generally, however, in this Article we do not
attempt to determine whether antitrust violations on the whole are insufficiently or excessively
deterred. Our aim is to establish a proposition that is more limited, although one that still
defies conventional wisdom: that private enforcement probably serves as a greater deterrent to
antitrust violations than criminal enforcement by the DO]. A demonstration that private
enforcement helps the law to more closely approximate optimal deterrence is a project for
another day.
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individuals be fined. Third, it can and occasionally does ask for
restitution. Fourth, it can request that some of the individuals
involved be imprisoned or placed under house arrest. IO The Division
also can secure injunctions to restore competition to the affected
markets. Since we know of no way to value these injunctions,
however, or to compare them to injunctions secured by private
parties, we have omitted them from our analysis. II

A. Optimal Deterrence of Cartels
The most generally accepted approach to optimally deterring
antitrust violations was developed by Professor William Landes,12
who convincingly showed that to achieve optimal 13 deterrence,14 the
total amount of the sanctions imposed against an antitrust violator

10. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 19992008, 13 n.14, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/242359.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010)
(The term other confinement "[iJncludes house arrest or confinement to a half\vay house or
community treatment center.").
11. Additionally, DOJ cases often set important legal precedents that can deter
anticompetitive conduct significantly. We do not know how to value these precedents,
however, or to compare their value to the value of precedents established through private
enforcement. For an excellent analysis of this topic, see Stephen Calkins, Coming to Praise
Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE (June 2006),
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2006(pdf)/200610-COMPedCalkins.
pdf. Calkins found that ofleading antitrust cases decided before 1977, twelve were private and
twenty-seven were government. Of the leading cases decided in 1977 or later, however, he
found thirty private cases and only fifteen government cases. [d. at 12, 14 (sample taken from
the leading cases printed in the leading antitrust casebook). Calkins concluded:
Today what is known as U.S. antitrust law no longer is exclusively or even
principally the consequence of Justice Department [or FTC or State] enforcement.
The leading modern cases on monopolization, attempted monopolization, joint
ventures, proof of agreement; boycott; other horizontal restraints of trade, resale
price maintenance, territorial restraints, vertical boycott claims, tying, price
discrimination, jurisdiction, and exemptions are almost all the result of litigation
brought by someone other than the Justice Department [or the FTC or the States].
[d. at 13 (citations omitted).
12. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv.
652 (1983). Landes built upon concepts developed in Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968), by applying them to the antitrust field.
13. The goal is optimal deterrence, not complete deterrence, because enforcement
aggressive enough to deter all cartels is likely to unduly penalize honest business conduct.
Therefore a proper balance must be struck to achieve optimal deterrence.
14. Professor Landes was not concerned with compensating victims. For an analysis that
takes victim compensation into account, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages
Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 161-68 (1993), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid= 1134822.
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should be equal to the violation's expected "net harm to others,"
divided by the probability of detection and proof of the violation. IS
Moreover, because not every cartel is detected or successfully
sanctioned, the "net harm to others" from cartels should be
multiplied by a number that is larger than one (the multiplier should
be the inverse of the probability of detection and proof).16 In other
words, the optimal penalty = (harms) -;- (probability of detection x
probability of proof).
In applying Landes's model, we will undertake several important
steps that warrant noting. First, we will attempt to compare financial
penalties imposed on corporations with similar penalties imposed on
the individual corporate actors who are personally responsible for an
antitrust violation. Second, we will attempt to compare financial
penalties with time in prison (or time spent under house arrest).
Of course, making these comparisons in an objective, accurate,
and non-controversial manner is not possible. The conventional
wisdom seems to be that fines are superior to prison as a way to

15. See Landes, supra note 12, at 657. If the harm was ten and the probability of
detection and proof .333, since (10/.333 = 30), the optimal penalty for this violation would
be 30. This ignores risk aversion and other factors. See id. Analysts of both the Chicago and
post-Chicago schools of antitrust have almost universally accepted these principles. See Lande,
supra note 14, at 125-26. Despite the general acknowledgement of the superiority of the
Landes approach, however, many respected scholars and enforcers instead focus upon the gain
to the lawbreaker, perhaps because it is simpler to calculate. For an insightful analysis, see
Wouter P.]. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD COMPETITION
183,190-93 (2006).
16. Unfortunately, this is often difficult to determine:
Of course, no one knows the percentage of cartels that are detected and proven. In
1986, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg (AAG
Ginsburg), estimated that the enforcers detected no more than 10% of all cartels.
There are reasons to believe that the Antitrust Division's amnesty program has
resulted in a larger percentage of cartels detected and proven today, but there is
anecdotal evidence that, despite the enforcers' superb efforts, many cartels still
operate. From an optimal deterrence perspective it would be necessary to know the
percentage of cartels that are detected and proven to know what number to multiply
the "net harms to others" by. At a minimum, however, we know that if the
combined antitrust sanctions only total the actual damages, firms would be
significantly undeterred from committing antitrust violations.
Ideally, optimal deterrence should be based upon the expectations of potential price
fixers, not the results of their price-fixing or the actual fines imposed. To ascertain
this, however, we would have to interview a random sample of potential price fixers
and discern their expectations. In reality, however, it would be impossible to
assemble a proper random sample or to get them to respond candidly.
John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for
Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TuL. L. REv. 513,519-20 (2005) (citations omitted).
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secure optimal deterrence. I7 However, one might argue, to put the
points in their strongest form, that corporate actors care only about
their own financial well-being and that prison sentences are so
abhorrent I8 that no corporate actor would be willing to risk prison,
no matter how large the financial gain (or, to put the point
somewhat differendy, that a corporate actor would be willing to pay
virtually any amount of money to avoid the risk of prison). 19

17. The conventional wisdom in the field was well summarized by V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1534
(1996) ("Thus, some justification for corporate criminal liability may have existed in the past,
when civil enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a deterrence perspective,
very little now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on
corporations.") .
18. See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 31 (2009); Donald I. Baker & Barbara A. Reeves, The
Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 621 (1977) ("Experience supports the
conclusion that businessmen view prison as uniquely unpleasant and that therefore
incarceration is a uniquely effective deterrent."); Arthur L. Liman, The Paper Label Sentences:
Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630,630-31 (1977) ("To the businessman ... prison is the inferno,
and conventional risk-reward analysis breaks down when the risk is jail.").
19. Baker & Reeves, mpra note 18, at 621-22. Note the important difference in these
two baselines: a corporate actor might demand a different sum to risk prison than they would
be willing to pay to avoid the risk of prison. For example, suppose someone would rather pay a
$2 million fine than be imprisoned for one year. How would that person react to the question
of whether they would accept $2 million in return to going to prison for one year? They might
not agree to this deal. Part of the difference is the relative wealth of the actor in the two
situations. A corporate actor can demand an unlimited amount to accept the risk of prison.
And any such payment increases his or her wealth. But the same person cannot pay an
unlimited amount to avoid the risk of prison. She can only spend as much money as she has or
can borrow. See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between
MeaSllres of Economic Values, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 424,428 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 2000). But there is another element at play here as well. Empirical
evidence shows that people's attitudes toward costs and benefits depend on their perception of
the status quo. Id. at 428-29. A person who accepts prison as the status quo may be willing to
pay less to avoid it than a person who sees prison as a deviation from the status quo. A
corollary is that, depending on the odds and stakes, people value avoiding losses-and are
willing to take risks to do so-far more than they value gains-which they generally will not
take risks to obtain (although, oddly, this principle may vary depending on the odds of the risk
and the size of the gain or loss). See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES fu"lD FRAMES 35-36 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 2000). This psychological phenomenon-and others-greatly
complicates an economic analysis of behavior. So, for example, a corporate actor who perceives
herself as taking steps that violate the antitrust law to return to the status quo (perhaps because
she thinks her corporation is suffering from unfair competition) may be far more tolerant of
risk than the same corporate actor who contemplates the same measure as a means of obtaining
a perceived economic advantage. Even for a single corporate actor, then, there may be no
single correct amount that represents her willingness to trade off between gain for her
corporation and the risk of prison for herself.
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The extreme form of these arguments is unpersuasive. Corporate
actors do in fact risk their own prison time for the financial benefit of
their employers when they violate the antitrust laws-by, for
example, participating in price fixing. Moreover, the literature on
antitrust law generally assumes that corporations maximize profits,
which means that it also assumes the interests of corporate
representatives and corporations generally align.20 Any other
approach would greatly complicate antitrust analysis, requiring an
inquiry not only into the market and its participants but also into the
internal workings of particular corporations. Indeed, there is an
odd-and usually unexplained-inconsistency when proponents of
the free market claim that corporations should not be subject to civil
liability for the wrongdoing of their representatives: if the free
market works in the sense that corporations respond in an efficient
manner to market incentives, including by encouraging corporate
representatives to act for the benefit of the corporation, why
shouldn't the same be true of legal sanctions?21
The work of Richard Posner provides a useful illustration. He
addresses-and rejects-the twin concerns about correlating financial
penalties to corporations with prison terms for corporate
representatives: (1) that corporate representatives have different
interests than corporations and (2) that prison time cannot be
equated with a monetary sum. The first issue involves a potential
20. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw ix (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter,
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW] (arguing that his brand of economic analysis of antitrust law has
come to predominate judicial doctrine, with a consensus that "business firms should be
assumed to be rational profit maximizers, so that the issue in evaluating the antitrust
significance of a particular business practice should be whether it is a means by which a rational
profit maximizer can increase its profits at the expense of efficiency"). See also Richard A.
Posner, Optimal SentCllcesfor White-Collar Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 417-18 & n.27
(1980) [hereinafter Posner, Optimal Sentences] (acknowledging that he has made "an
argument ... in the antitrust context for confining criminal (or civil-penalty) liability to the
corporation, on the theoty that if it is liable it will find adequate ways of imposing on its
employees the costs to it of violating the law") (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225-26 (1976». The same is true for scholars of a similar ilk in
the field of securities. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 4 (1996) ("Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors,
but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors'
interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.").
21. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Sentencing the Corporation, 71 B.D. L. REv. 383,
385 (1991) ("While it is true that managers have a hard time gerting the rank and file to adapt
to market threats, no one suggests that corporations are so hidebound or so buffered from
their capital environments that market penalties must be ruinously high before the company
will respond. Why should it be otherwise with legal penalties?").
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divergence of interests between principal and agent, which
economists tend to call agency costs. Posner's response:
A corporation has effective methods of preventing its employees
from committing acts that impose huge [antitrust] liabilities on it.
A sales manager whose unauthorized participation in a paltry pricefixing scheme resulted in the imposition of a $1 million fine on his
employer would thereafter, I predict, have great difficulty finding
responsible employment, and this prospect should be sufficient to
deter. 22

In other words, corporations can and will impose incentives that
align their interests and the interests of their representatives.
Posner has also addressed the second issue-the concern that
prison time cannot be correlated to financial penalties. He has
argued for "the substitution, whenever possible, of the fine (or civil
penalty) for the prison sentence as the punishment for crime.,,23 His
contention is, particularly in cases of "white collar" crime,24 that
"fining the affiuent offender is preferable to imprisoning him from
society's standpoint because it is less costly and no less efficacious. ,,25
As he notes, "The fine [or civil liability] for a white-collar crime can
be set at whatever level imposes the same disutility on the defendant,
and thus yield the same deterrence, as the prison sentence that would
have been imposed instead. ,,26

22. POSNER, fu"lTITRUST LAw, supra note 20, at 271. But see John Collins Coffee, Jr.,
Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions,
17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 458-59 (1980) (noting examples of limited internal sanctions
imposed against individuals responsible for antitrust violations).
23. Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 20, at 409.
24. Id. at 409-10 (defining "white collar" crime).
25. Id.at410.
26. Id. Posner is familiar with resistance to this claim-indeed, his article responds in
part to a sophisticated criticism by John Coffee that contends that "the threat of imprisonment
is inherently greater than that of a fine," id. at 413 (citing Coffee, sttpra note 22), or,
presumably, civil liability. Posner usefully distills Coffee's argument to three points: (1)
financial penalties work only if the culpable party has the means to pay them; (2) fines
themselves work only if backed by a sufficient penalty for non-payment (otherwise they will not
be paid); and (3) culpable parties are likely to experience an increasing marginal loss of utility
as fines get larger (at least up until the point that they have no money left), but a decreasing
marginal loss of utility as prison sentences grow in length. Id. at 413-14. The first two points
have only limited significance for our Article: corporations generally can pay the damages they
owe and courts have methods of making them do so, including mulcting them with sanctions
for contempt. But Coffee's point about the potentially complicated relationship between
financial penalties and prison time does suggest that any ratio between prison time and money
will be an imperfect approximation.
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Thus skeptics of private enforcement with a Chicago school
orientation-including Posner himself 7-should not rely on agency
costs or the inherent superiority of prison as a deterrent to reject an
effort to compare the deterrence effects of private enforcement and
criminal prosecutions. 28
More plausible points are that a financial penalty against an
individual has more of an impact than a similar penalty against a
corporation and that one year of prison time is equivalent to a
relatively large financial penalty. We make accommodations for these
plausible assumptions in our analysis infra by tripling the disvalue or
deterrence effects of individual sanctions relative to corporate
sanctions. 29
27. See, e.g., POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 20, at 274-75. Posner's concern
about antitrust class actions is particularly curious. He levels two criticisms: first, that class
action lawyers have incentive to settle cases for relatively small amounts compared to their
actual worth and, second, that risk-averse corporations may settle claims for too much because
of an unlikely possibility of an extraordinarily large loss. Id. at 275. Posner does not address the
fact that these tendencies-if real-are off-setting.
28. Indeed, Posner even suggests what he believes to be a feasible method for
estimating the trade-off between years in prison and monetary sanctions:
[AJ promising method would be to infer statistically the relative deterrent effect of
fine and prison. Suppose that in one federal district the average fine for a federal
white-collar offense is $1,000 and the average prison term 30 days, and in another
district it is $800 and 40 days, and so forth. Then, by comparing the incidence of
the offenses across districts, we should be able to infer the rate of exchange at which
days in jail translate into dollars of fine with no loss of deterrence. (A study of state
white-collar prosecutions, conducted along similar lines, might also be feasible.)
Since no such study has been attempted, I cannot evaluate the difficulties it might
encounter arising, for example, because the incidence of many white-collar crimes
(e.g., price-fixing conspiracies) is unknown, or the gravity of the crime may vary
across districts or states, which affects the optimal sentence. Such a study might not
produce results entitled to great confidence. Nevertheless, supplemented by the
intuition that guides judges today in devising fine-prison "packages" to impose on
white collar offenders, such a study should provide a close enough approximation of
the actual fine-prison trade-off that we need not fear that by substituting fines for
prison sentences in white-collar cases we would be drastically altering the expected
punishment cost, and hence the level, of white-collar crime.
Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 20, at 413. We know of no study along these lines. And,
of course, the analysis assumes that compliance with antitrust law depends primarily, perhaps
even exclusively, on the incentives created by money or prison. Cf Stone, supra note 21, at
389 (arguing that the "moral responsibility" to obey the law explains the compliance of many
corporate actors).
29. We readily acknowledge that our decision to triple the deterrence effects of the
individual penalties relative to corporate penalties was arbitrary.
A critic of private enforcement could argue that even a very large amount of money
paid by the corporation is meaningless from a deterrence perspective-that managers could
care less how much money their corporations pay. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to
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Perhaps optimal deterrence can only be secured by a mix of
corporate and individual sanctions. If only corporations were subject
to penalties, individuals might be unduly tempted to form cartels if,
as has been suggested by some research,30 they did not face
significant internal sanctions for their illegal behavior 3! or an
appropriate diminution of their future income. On the other hand, if
only individual penalties existed, it could be in the interests of some
corporations to establish internal incentives that failed to discourage,
rewarded, or even coerced employees into engaging in illegal
behavior. 32 Some corporations might prefer to offer up a few
executives for multi-year prison terms rather than pay $100 million
or more in a criminal fine or payout in private litigation. 33 In light of
these complexities, this Article will use a total deterrence approach
and will determine the sum of individual and corporate deterrence.
As noted earlier, our analysis will make accommodations for these
complexities and agency-principal problems by tripling the disvalue
or deterrence effects of individual sanctions relative to corporate
sanctions. With these qualifications in place, we can begin our
Damn, No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,
79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 393 (1981). They could argue that only individual fines and prison
matter at all from a deterrence perspective, so private enforcement does not deter anything. Of
course, this view contradicts the basic assumption that corporations are profit maximizers.
Surely corporations do not like paying millions or billions of dollars, so there must be some
deterrence from private cases. Moreover, the individuals responsible for this liability are likely
to have their careers detrimentally affected when their actions require their corporation to pay
large sums in private cases. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 20, at 271 (arguing that
causing a corporation to suffer financial losses will harm careers of employees); cf Coffee, Stlpra
note 22, at 458-59 (providing examples of corporate representatives violating the law to the
detriment ofthe corporation but not suffering adverse consequences). For these reasons, while
correlating financial penalties to corporations with prison time to corporate representatives is
tricky, it seems to overstate the case to suggest there is no correlation whatsoever.
30. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 458-59.
31. Greg Werden suggests additional reasons: "This can occur as a result of defects in
the design of compensation schemes, especially if the executives have short time horizons or
are more willing than business enterprises to take risks. Consequently, business enterprises can
incur substantial costs in monitoring their executives and complying with the law." See
Werden, Stlpra note 18, at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 32.
33. Suppose that, instead of a corporate fine or payouts in private cases, a corporation
could offer up to the Department of Justice five executives who would each be sentenced to
three years in prison. Suppose the corporation could pay each of the individuals involved $2
million per executive per year by depositing the appropriate sums in Swiss bank accounts. This
would only cost the corporation $30 million, far less than many of the larger fines that have
been imposed in recent years, and less than the private payouts in every one of the cases
studied by the authors in their sample of private cases.
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analysis by addressing the deterrence
enforcement of the antitrust laws.

effect of the

DOJ's

B. Deterrence from DO] Cartel Fines and Restitution
The Antitrust Division has successfully prosecuted hundreds of
cartels. While it is of course impossible to determine how many
cartels were never formed due to the prospect of penalties resulting
from investigations (i.e., how much deterrence the Antitrust
Division's cases were responsible for), surely it is significant. We are
of course unable to quantify the actual deterrence from the DOJ's
efforts. We can, however, quantify various DOJ remedies-corporate
fines, individual fines, restitution, and imprisonment-out of our
belief that on average the corporations and individuals involved will
tend to respond rationally to these sanctions, and that heavy
sanctions will tend to discourage cartel formation.
The total of the corporate fines imposed in every DOJ criminal
antitrust case from 1990 to 2007 has been $4.167 billion. 34 The
total of the individual fines imposed in these cases has been $67
million. 35
During this same period, the Antitrust Division has also secured
restitution of $118 million in conjunction with criminal antitrust
cases. 36 This largely or totally consists of restitution to the federal
government for the overcharges it paid to price fixers. As the
Division's
Workload
Statistics
notes
with
considerable
understatement, "[fJrequently restitution is not sought in criminal
antitrust cases, as damages are obtained through treble damage
actions filed by the victims. ,,37

C. Deterrence Effects of Prison and House Arrest
DOJ prosecutions also result in prison sentences and house
arrests, which significantly deter illegal activity as well. From 1990 to
2007 criminal prosecutions by the DOJ Antitrust Division resulted
in sentences that total 330.24 years in prison. 38 In addition, Antitrust
Division activity also led to another 96.85 years of "house arrest or
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 3.
U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, sttpra note 10, at 12 n.13.
See infra Table 4. We define one year as equal to 365.25 days.
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confinement to a halfway house or community treatment center.,,39
However, these figures might be somewhat inaccurate for the
purposes at hand for two reasons.
First, these figures are for time sentenced, not time served. We
were unable to determine how much of this time actually was served
or how often sentences were reduced.
Second, sometimes an investigation by the Antitrust Division
results in a sentence for an unrelated or marginally related crime,
regardless of whether an antitrust violation was uncovered.
Unrelated crimes can include perjury, mail fraud, contempt,
obstruction of justice, and false statements. 40 Since the Antitrust
Division uncovered these crimes, often Antitrust Division
investigators are in the best position to pursue these issues, even
though they are not antitrust violations. They often do so but,
unfortunately, we have not been able to find out how frequently this
occurs. 4 !
For simplicity, we are ignoring these issues. The figures reported
above for prison time and house arrest therefore will be used in our
subsequent analysis even though they are larger than they should be.
As such, these unadjusted estimates will overestimate the probable
deterrence effect of the DOJ anti-cartel program to some extent.
Using these figures, how could we fairly value-or disvaluetime spent in prison or under house arrest? Since no one wants to
spend any time in prison or under house arrest, should we disvalue it
infinitely and assume that even a small probability of spending any
time in prison or under house arrest has an infinite deterrence value?
No. People do not act as if they infinitely disvalue the risk of
getting put into prison or placed under house arrest for an antitrust
offense. If they did, they would never try to form a cartel because
this would put them at risk of getting caught and sentenced. Rather,
potential offenders appear to tolerate the risk of prison. Perhaps they
calculate, at least to some very rough degree, their apparent chances
of getting caught and the prison sentence, house arrest, or fine they
39. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, sttpra note 10, at 13; see also infra Table 5.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 8 (listing these crimes under the header
"Other Criminal Cases").
41. Sometimes these other crimes are related to an antitrust offense-such as when a
cartel bribes a federal purchasing agent. Other times they are not. Often they are very difficult
to classifY. According to the DOl, "Other Federal Crimes such as Perjury, Mail Fraud,
Contempt, Obstruction of Justice, or False Statements" have constituted 16% of their criminal
convictions since 1990 (23% in recent years, when prison sentences have been longer). [d.
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are likely to face. They then balance this chance of a penalty, again in
an extremely rough way, against the rewards of cartelization. In any
case, they often decide to form cartels. We know they often make
this decision because cartelists surely know cartels are illegal, yet the
number of cartels caught in recent years has been quite significant
and does not seem to be decreasing. 42 From 1990-2007,550 people
were sentenced to prison or house arrest as a result of 958 successful
Antitrust Division cases. 43 Moreover, the large number of cartels
42. The continued high number of DOJ grand juries, and the recent DOJ success rate
in the courts, is evidence that many cartels still exist. As of the close ofFY 2007, the DOJ had
approximately 135 pending grand jury investigations. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the 56th Annual
Spring Meeting of the Dep't of Justice: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones In the
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program 2 (Mar. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public /speeches/232716.pdf. Between 2000 and 2009, the
DOJ filed anywhere from thirty-two to seventy-two criminal cases per year, most of which
resulted in convictions. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD
STATISTICS FY 2000-2009 4, 9 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
workload-statistics.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 20ll). The following table, extracted from this
data, shows the DOT's success in prosecuting antitrust violations:

Total
Criminal
Cases

'00

'01

'02

'03

'04

'05

'06

'07

'08

'09

Filed

63

44

33

41

42

32

34

40

54

72

Won

52

38

37

32

35

36

31

31

47

67

Lost

-

2

1

1

1

1

-

1

4

2

Pending

35

39

34

42

48

43

44

54

57

60

Appeal
Decisions

-

5

1

2

7

4

5

1

4

2

Grand Juries
Initiated

26

26

26

48

21

38

38

34

32

38

It seems clear that, in the opinion of a large number of judges, grand juries, and juries, the
DOJ Antitrust Division has been bringing a large number of meritorious anti-cartel cases in
recent years. Note that in some years the DOJ won more cases than it filed because the cases
the DOJ won in any given year were often filed in an earlier year.
43. These 958 cases could be the total for both individual and corporate cases. If so, this
figure would be significantly overcounting the "true" number of cartel offenses. According to
the DOT's statistics, during this period 864 individuals were charged, as were 678
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discovered in recent years may be evidence that the current overall
level of cartel sanctions is too low.
Thus, in theory we can establish a non-infinite value for the
disutility of prison time. To do this in practice is, of course,
extremely difficult and speculative. There is no one objective way to
compare the deterrence effect of time spent in prison to the
deterrence effect of a criminal fine because different people would
trade off jail versus fines in different ways. Any "average" figure used
to equate the two is necessarily imprecise and arbitrary.
We will undertake three different approaches to this issue. We
hope that this Article's use of three approaches will increase the
reliability of its results.
1. Valuations of lives and years of life for other regulatory) public policy
purposes
The valuation of one year of life "loss" in prison, or due to house
arrest, is similar to one that, regrettably, society often must
undertake for any number of public policy purposes. Sometimes a life
must even be valued at an amount that is less than infinity. For
example, our nation cannot afford perfect safety and we do not want
every automobile to be built as safely as possible because society
cannot afford this. Similarly, even though a life is beyond value and
society does not want people to drive negligently, courts do not
award infinite damages for the loss of life in car crashes.
On average, studies that value lives in the United States for
public policy purposes-e.g., when agencies set product safety,
transportation, safety, or environmental requirements-typically
arrive at values between $3 million and $10 million per life. 44 By
contrast, lower figures, on average between $1.4 million and $3.8

corporations. All totals for the years 1990-2007 were calculated by adding the yearly totals as
reported in the U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY
1990-1998 (on file with author) and the U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, supra note 10.
44. See Joseph E. A1dy & w. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for
Age and Cohort Effects, 90 REv. ECON & STAT. 573, 579 (2008). Recently the Department of
Transportation has used $5.8 million for the value of a life. Memorandum from Tyler D.
Duvall, Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Policy, U.S. Dep't of Transp. & D. J. Gribbin, Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp. to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm'rs, U.S. Dep't ofTransp.,
available at http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/policy/reports/080205.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2011). The Environmental Protection Agency currently uses $6.9 million. All Thi17gs
Considered: Value on Life 11 Percent Lower Than 5 Years Ago (NPR radio broadcast July 11,
2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=92470116.
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million, are awarded in wrongful death cases. 4S Other studies analyze
the data slightly differently by attempting to place a value on one
year of life. They calculate figures in the range of an average of
$300,000 to $500,000 per person per year of life (depending upon a
number ofvariables).46 It is likely that most people would prefer the
prospect of spending one year in prison to the prospect of losing one
year of life; after all, many prisoners with no chance at parole still
resist the death penalty.
Thus, in theory we can establish a non-infinite value for the
disutility of prison time. To do this in practice is extremely difficult
and speculative. While there is no way to directly value the
deterrence effect of prison time, a conservative alternative is to
assume that people would disvalue one year in prison the same as
they would disvalue one year's worth of life. This means the above
results, which calculated the average value of one year of life to be
worth $300,000 to $500,000 per year, should be assumed to be
roughly equal to the average disvalue of one year in prison.
Moreover, one year of house arrest should be disvalued at a
significantly lower figure.
2. Awards made by the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund
Following the September 11th tragedy, Congress created the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund ("the Fund") to award
compensation to victims' families. 47 Kenneth Feinberg was appointed
Special Master and charged with deciding the appropriate amounts
of compensation. 48 The Fund sought to avoid a "complex adversarial
process" while still honoring fairness and consistency.49 The Fund's
45. See Mark A. Cohen & Ted R. Miller, "Willingness to Award" Nonmonetary
Damages and the Implied Value of Life from Jury Awards, 23 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 165,
166,179 (2003) (calculations made in 1995 dollars).
46. See Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 44, at 4. These figures are lower for older people. Id.
A study by Stanford researchers calculated only $129,000 per year. Kathleen Kingsbury, The
Value of Human Life: $129,000, TiME.COM (May 20, 2008), http://
www.time.com/time/health/article/0.8599.1808049.00.html.
47. See Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)
[hereinafter "the Act") (we are grateful to Thomas Weaver for his research involving the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund).
48. See generally 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REpORT OF THE SPECIAL
MAsTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 1-4 (2004)
[hereinafter "FEINBERG REPORT"]' available at http://www.usdoj.gov/finaCreport.pdf.
49. See id. at 6. Congress mandated a "hybrid" compensation system. Like the tort
system, Congress required the Special Master to consider economic and non-economic loss.
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payments thus constitute a prominent reflection of the monetary
value our society places on innocent human life, even though these
payouts were made under unique circumstances. 50 Significantly, the
victims include a large number of middle class and upper class people
who, at least in terms of their income and status as corporate
executives, are likely to be roughly comparable to incarcerated price
fixers.
The Fund's average award was $2,082,035 for damages to the
direct victims of the terrorist attack, plus an average offset for
collateral payments (damages to family members) of $855,826, for a
total average award of $2,937,861. The median award was
$1,677,632. The maximum award was $7,100,000, and the
minimum award was $250,000. 51
Many of the September 11th victims had been quite affluent,
including eighty-nine whose annual income had been between
$500,000 and $1,000,000 per year (their estates were given average
awards of $4,749,654), and eight victims whose annual income
exceeded $4,000,000 per year (their estates were given average
awards of $6,379,287).52 Although we do not know the average or
typical pre-conviction annual incomes of imprisoned price fixers, we
would not be surprised if the amounts were comparable.

3. Awards in wrongful imprisonment cases
Another approach to approximating the disutility of prison or
house arrest time imposed for antitrust violations comes from
examining the disvalue society places on prison time in a very
However, unlike the tort system, the Special Master could not consider issues of liability or
punitive damages, and the Special Master was required to reduce awards by payments from
certain collateral sources. Id. A larger purpose of the Act was to save the airline industry from
collapse and to protect the American economy from the consequences of that collapse by
creating an alternative to direct litigation against the airlines. See id. at 3; see also generally Air
Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000).
50. The Special Master extensively researched "theories of compensation and
methodologies for the calculation of economic loss, as well as the various state laws governing
wrongful death actions," and met with "numerous economists, experts and actuaries, both in
the private sector and in the federal government" as to the calculation of economic loss and
determinations on collateral sources. Between issuing its interim and final regulations, the
Fund reviewed and sought to integrate "2,687 timely comments" on issues that ranged from
the technical and specific, to fundamental questions regarding the larger purpose and policy of
the Fund. See FEINBERG, supra note 48, at 4-5.
51. Id. at 110 tb1.l2.
52. See infra Table 6.
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different context: the compensation provided to people who have
been wrongly imprisoned. Sometimes people are wrongly sentenced
to prison in a miscarriage of justice by, for example, perjured
testimony. 53 The victims potentially can recover for a variety of torts,
depending upon the jurisdiction. 54 They can receive compensatory
damages, emotional damages, pumuve damages, or some
combination thereof. 55 Many of these situations involve suits against
governmental actors, and sometimes the maximum awards in these
cases are fixed by statute. 56 Other times a suit is brought as a
common law tort case. Often no award will be given for
imprisonment due to a simple, albeit tragic, error; some type of
intentional act, malice, or malfeasance is required. 57
We have located payments made in a total of nineteen wrongful
imprisonment cases. 58 The highest payment we found for a case
involving at least one year of prison was $1.165 million per year, for

53. See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d. 143,152 (D. Mass. 2007) (FBI was
aware chief witness would perjure himself); see also Newsome v. McCabe 319 F.3d 301, 30405 (7th Cir. 2003) (officers induced eyewitnesses to falsely identify plaintiff); Bravo v. Giblin,
No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002) (investigating officer
fabricated evidence). The authors are grateful to Thomas Weaver for locating and analyzing
these cases, and for performing research on this subject. See Thomas Weaver, The Part That
Counts: Wrongful Incarceration Awards and the Value of Human Life (unpublished
manuscript) (May 2010) (on file with the authors).
54. These torts include wrongful imprisonment, wrongful conviction, wrongful
confinement, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, false arrest, or an unconstitutional depravation of their civil rights. See infra
Appendix II, Table A.
55. "Losses of this magnitude are almost impossible to catalogue. The loss of liberty.
The loss of the enjoyment of their families. The loss of the ability to care for and nurture their
children. The loss of intimacy and closeness with their spouses. Indeed, the task of quantifying
these losses-which I am obliged to do-is among the most difficult this Court has ever had to
undertake. Where triers of fact must assign values to the intangible and invaluable, they may
look to the values assigned by other fact-finders in the past. I do not blindly follow other
awards, but I do look to them for perspective and as an indication of how society has valued
these harms. I note also that damage and suffering do not accrue smoothly and proportionally
on a monthly or annual basis. Some injury occurs all in a rush at the start-the shock and
horror of arrest and conviction-while other injury only begins to compound after a significant
period of time has passed-the setting in of despair, or the withering of relationships. I
consider the particular story of this case and these plaintiffs' suffering." Limone, 497 F. Supp.
2d at 243.
56. See, eg., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2513 (West 2010).
57. See, eg., supra examples accompanying note 55.
58. See infra Appendix II, Table A.

332

315

Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement

three years of wrongful confinement for a false conviction. 59
However, when shorter imprisonments are annualized, significantly
higher figures sometimes resulted. 60 By contrast, the lowest payment
we found compensated the wrongfully imprisoned person at the rate
of only $23,529 per year. 61 The 75th percentile of these nineteen
awards is approximately $1,000,000 per year; the 25th percentile is
approximately $140,000 per year. 62 We should note, however, that
these results are complicated and may be ambiguous because the
cases often also involved allegations of, and sometimes specific
awards for, false arrest, false conviction, overly harsh interrogation
techniques, malicious prosecution, and other factors. 63 Rarely are
these awards unambiguously and solely for false imprisonment.
In addition to the nineteen final awards, we found many others
that were not included in our study because the false imprisonment
awards were too confounded with compensation for the initial arrest
59. Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18,2002).
Suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 yielded "damages in the amount of $221,976 for his
economic losses, $3,537,000 to compensate him for 1,179 days of incarceration at the rate of
$3,000 per day, and $1 million to compensate him for emotional distress suffered between the
date of the incident and the date of his sentencing." [d. at *24. We arrived at the award per
year of imprisonment of $1,138,951.77 in this case by multiplying $3,000 a day by 365.25 to
arrive at $1,095,750. The lost earnings of $221,976, divided by 1,179 days in prison and
multiplied by 365.25 days, comes to $188.28 per day and adds another $68,767.37 per year.
The total award per year of imprisonment thus comes to $1,164,517.37.
60. See id. (investigating officer fabricated evidence) (lO-month sentence led to a $9
million settlement; this is an annual rate of $10,800,000). Because the emotional stress and
discomfort could be disproportionately greater at the beginning of a prison sentence, it is
unclear whether the award would have been increased proportionately if the victim had been
imprisoned for one year, or for multiple years. As noted, in these cases it is difficult to
segregate the amounts awarded for false imprisonment from the amounts awarded for onetime
events or other torts. "Where the period of incarceration is shorter (eg., less than one year),
proportionately larger awards (measured by annualizing the award) have been rendered,
presumably reflecting Limone's observation that the injury from incarceration may be more
intense towards the beginning." Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1242 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago
View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 431 (1980) (noting
that "the declining marginal utility of imprisonment means that each increment of
incarceration increases the perceived penalty by a less than proportionate amount; or, reduced
to its simplest terms, a two-year prison term is not twice as bad as a one-year term").
61. See Avery v. Manitowoc Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
62. See infra Appendix II, Table A.
63. For example, one case involved a month in jail and an award of $355,500 for false
imprisonment, as well as "$71,100 for false arrest; $71,100 for intentional infliction of
emotional distress ... and $213,300 for malicious prosecution." Jones v. City of Chicago, No.
83C2430, 1987 WL 19800, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 856 F.2d 985
(7th Cir. 1988).
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or were not yet final.64 For a variety of reasons, including our small
sample size, the near certainty that our research failed to uncover
many cases, the existence of secret settlements, and the confounding
of awards for false imprisonment with awards for related torts such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, we present the mean
($1,267,369, which was significantly affected by two very high
annualized awards for imprisonment of less than one year) and
median ($214,286) of these results with great reluctance. One
reason for our hesitation concerns the income levels of the people
involved. We have not been able to ascertain any of the falsely
imprisoned defendants' incomes, but we suspect most had a low
income. Although some were middle class,65 few or none of the
wrongfully imprisoned people appear to have been corporate
executives or upper-class professionals. 66 It is possible that a jury or
judge would award a corporate executive wrongfully imprisoned for
price fixing a larger than average amount for their suffering. 67 Still,
these results do tend to show that figures in the neighborhood of $1
million per year appear generally to be the practical maximum that
society is willing to award for one year wrongfully spent in prison.
4. Estimates by antitrust scholars
A fourth approach is to assemble and analyze similar estimates by
scholars. We have been able to find only two estimates for the
disutility of one year in prison for an antitrust offense that seem
plausible in this context. 68 Both were made by extremely reputable
scholars. Both are roughly consistent with the estimates above.
First, an article by Professors Howard P. Marvel and others
equated one year in jail for price fixing to approximately $600,000 in

64. For examples, see Weaver, supra note 53.
65. For example, see Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 307 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
was an unemployed paralegal, although he testified at trial that he was employed at the time
incarceration began.
66. See Appendix II, Table A.
67. It is possible, however, that a jury might react in the opposite direction. A jury
might be less sympathetic to imprisoned upper-class corporate executives.
68. We have found one other estimate, but it seems to value prison time at an unduly
low level for white-collar criminals. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging
Guilt: Forcing Self-Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 263,
283 & n. 52 (2008) (estimating value of prison at approximately $200 per day, which amounts
to slightly more than $70,000 per year).
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2010 dollars.69 Another study by Professor Kenneth Glenn DauSchmidt and others equated one year in jail for price fixing with a
fine of $1.5 million today. 70 These figures are higher than the
average valuations for one year of life noted earlier, perhaps because
price fixers are wealthier on average and can afford to disvalue prison
time much more than most people can, or perhaps because price
fixers' time is more valuable on average. 71
5. A conservative resolution of the issue
These four approaches yield estimates that are broadly consistent
with one another. To be conservative, we have taken the highest of
these estimates for the disvalue of one year in prison, $1,500,000 per
year, and arbitrarily increased it to $2 million.72 We will use this as
the disvalue or deterrence equivalent of one year in prison. We will
use $1 million for the disvalue or deterrence equivalent of one year
of house arrest. We note that $2 million is as much as the lowest
estimates for the value of a human life noted earlier. We believe these
figures are significantly more than the average deterrence effect of
one year in prison (or, a fortiori, of one year of house arrest, but we

69. See Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 40 STAN. L. REv. 561, 573 (1988). The authors equated one year in prison with a
$300,000 fine. The article appeared in the February 1988 issue, so we assume they were using
1987 dollars. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates
$300,000 in 1987 to $577,825 in 2010. See CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Mar. 17,2011).
70. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt et aI., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A
Study of Law and Economics, in 16 RESEARCH IN LAw AND ECONOMICS 25 (Richard O.
Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1994) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstraccid
=712721. This article equated one year in jail with a fine of $1 million. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates $1,000,000 in 1994 and
$1,431,802 in 2010. See CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69. Professors DauSchmidt et al. were using 1982 data for much of their paper's analysis. If they meant their
valuation of one year in jail to be expressed in 1982 dollars, then their $1,000,000 estimate
would be the equivalent of $2,198,891 in 2010. Id.
71. Whether the time or the life of a price fixer is more, or less, valuable than that of an
average person is an interesting philosophical question that this Article will not explore.
72. We do not believe $2 million is the true cost or deterrent value of one year in
prison. We nevertheless decided to use this figure, which we believe to be unduly high, in our
subsequent analysis in order to take a conservative and relative non-controversial approach to
the issue.
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are selecting them so that our methodology will be conservative and
as non-controversial as possible).73
Using the assumption that a sentence of one year of incarceration
has the same deterrence effect as a $2 million fine, the collective
330.24 years of prison sentences received by antitrust defendants
from 1990 to 2007 would be the equivalent of about $660 million
in criminal fines. Using the assumption that a sentence of one year of
house arrest has the same deterrence effect as a $1 million fine, the
collective 96.85 years of house arrest received by antitrust defendants
from 1990 to 2007 would be the equivalent of nearly $97 million in
criminal fines. These figures total about $757 million.
As noted earlier, however, penalties directed against the
individuals involved might well have more of a deterrence effect than
penalties directed against the corporations. To illustrate how this
could affect our analysis, we have trebled the deterrence effect of
every individual penalty before adding them to the corporate
penalties. This means using $6 million for the deterrence value of
one year in prison74 and $3 million for the deterrence value of one
year of house arrest, and also trebling the $67 million in individual
penalties?5 Thus, the $757 million calculated earlier would be
increased to $2.271 billion, and the $67 million in individual fines
would be increased to $201 million. Add to these figures the $4.166
billion in corporate fines and $118 million in restitution, and the
quantifiable deterrence effect of the Antitrust Division's remedies
from 1990 to 2007 totals $6.756 billion. If the corporate fines,
individual fines, and restitution figures are converted to 2010 dollars

73. We note that valuing one year's worth of life at $2 million would mean that a
twenty year prison sentence would be valued at $40 million, a figure far in excess of the
amount that society places on an individual's life.
74. We note that valuing one year's worth of life at $6 million would mean that a
twenty year prison sentence would be valued at $120 million, a figure far in excess of the
amount that society places on an individual's life.
75. This assumes that the individuals actually pay their own fines. It is, however, difficult
to determine whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees are ultimately paid
by the employees, or are often, or usually, directly or indirectly paid by their employer. This
area of law is exceedingly complex, and, of course, even if indemnification is illegal, this does
not mean that it does not occur regularly. See 1 ROGER MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION § 9:37 (West November 2009); Pamela H. Bucey, Corporate Executives Who Have
Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REv.
279 (1991); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed By Federal Securities and
Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1403 (1963).
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and added to the $2.271 billion equivalent for prison time and
house arrest/ 6 the total would be $7.737 billion.
One final note about DOJ enforcement is appropriate. Its record
of overwhelming success suggests the government pursues only very
strong cases. Note, for example, that for the years 1992 to 2008, the
DOJ filed 699 cases and won 645 cases?7 This would appear to
translate to a winning rate of over 92%. To be sure, this percentage
may be misleading because the DOJ's win rate in court is
significantly lower. 78 Moreover, the cases filed in a given year
generally are not the ones resolved in that year. Still, such a high
success rate demonstrates that the DOJ does not like to lose. We do
not mean this point as a criticism. It may well be appropriate for the
government to bring litigation only if it is very confident it will win.
But that comes at a cost. The DOJ appears much more willing to
tolerate a false negative (a failure to prosecute a violation of the
antitrust laws) than a false positive (litigating a case when in fact
there was no violation). In other words, it appears the DOJ chooses
not to pursue litigation in many meritorious cases, perhaps at least in
part because it lacks the necessary resources. This may well create a
need for private litigation as a complement to government
enforcement of the antitrust laws. 79

III. DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
We know of no information concerning how much defendants
have paid in total as a result of private antitrust litigation during this
same or any other period. We do not even know of extraordinarily
rough estimates.
One extremely low floor on this amount, however, can be
obtained from the Lande/Davis study of forty of the largest private
antitrust cases that ended between 1990 and 2007. 80 Our primary
76. See infra Table 15.
77. U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
78. See John M. Connor, Problems with Prison in International Cartel Cases, 56
ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming Spring 2011).
79. The ideal proportion of success to failure will depend on a number of variables,
including the relative harms from false negatives and false positives and the likelihood of false
negatives to false positives. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
80. This was not a cost/benefit analysis of private enforcement. We made no attempt to
assess any of its costs, or all of its benefits. Rather, the main point of this project was to assess
those benefits that easily could be quantified. We did not select a random sample of private
cases and follow them cradle to grave, assessing the merits or lack of merits of each. This would
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screen was that each case must have returned $50 million or more to
victims of antitrust violations. Actually, they were "alleged" victims
because almost all the cases settled with no finding that defendants
had violated the antitrust lawsY We did not want to make subjective
judgments over whether to value products at their retail value, their
wholesale value, or defendants' cost. We counted all products as
being worth nothing. We did the same thing for coupons or for
discounts because they all have uncertain redemption rates: all
discounts and coupons were counted as zero. 82
This study documents between $18 and $19.6 billion in cash
paid by defendants in these forty cases alone. In 2010 dollars, these
totals would be $21.9 billion to $23.9 billion. 83 Since this total does
not include any value for the products, discounts, or coupons
received in these cases, and also leaves out defendants' attorneys' fees
and other litigation costs (including expert witness fees) and the
disruptive effects of the litigation on corporate efficiency, it
understates the actual deterrence from these cases because all these
omitted factors also have deterrence effects. 84
In terms of overall deterrence, therefore, these forty private cases
resulted in approximately three times the deterrence of the $7.737
billion in deterrence produced by every criminal case brought by the
be difficult to do since almost every private case is dismissed or settled, and for this reason it
would be hard to find out the relevant information about each case. We did not limit ourselves
to cases where the Court found an antitrust violation because these are rare. Only twenty-four
final cartel cases calculated an overcharge since 1890. See Connor & Lande, supra note 16. For
a list of cases and their recoveries see infra Table 7.
81. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 891 n.46.
82. We eliminated many cases because they were too difficult to value, even cases
valued in the press at more than $1 billion. Moreover, sometimes it was just not possible to get
the necessary information out of old files or from the preoccupied lawyers possessing the
necessary information.
We did not adjust the settlements for inflation by raising them to their present value.
Nor did we subtract attorneys' fees or other claims administration expenses because, for
deterrence purposes, it does not matter what happened to the money paid by Defendants.
We did not attempt to value injunctive relief, even for those cases where a Court
characterized this relief as being very important. Although injunctions can greatly benefit both
victims and the economy as a whole, we were unable to ascertain an objective and reliable way
to quantifY the value of injunctive relief. Neither did we attempt to value the injunctive relief
secured by the DO]. For more on our methodology, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, sttpra note
*, at 889-91.
83. See infra Table 14.
84. As noted earlier, injunctive relief secured by these forty cases also was omitted,
further understating the deterrence value of these cases. However, the effects of injunctive
relief secured by DO] cases were also excluded.
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DOJ during this same period in 2010 dollars. As noted earlier, this
comparison is not just to DOJ actions involving these forty private
cases; the DOJ total is for every cartel sanction secured by the
Division between 1990 and 2007.
In addition to comparing the probable amount of deterrence
from the recoveries in the forty large private cases to the likely
deterrence from the DOJ sanctions, there are a number of other
comparisons that could be made, such as deterrence from all the
DOJ cartel cases to the subsamples of the forty private cases that
were against cartels, or where the DOJ also obtained relief, or where
the DOJ also received a criminal penalty. For each comparison, the
private deterrence is at least as large as the DOJ deterrence. 85
Alternatively, one could redo this analysis using different values
for the disincentive effect of one year in jail. For example, instead of

85. For example, not all of these forty cases were against cartels; some were against
monopolies (although none of the many class actions against Microsoft were included due to
data problems). Using nominal dollars, of the total recoveries of $18 to 19.6 billion, $9.2 to
$10.6 billion was paid in twenty-five cases that were litigated under the per se approach. This
sample of twenty-five cases thus excludes payouts by monopolies. Comparing this $9.2 to
$10.6 billion to the $6.756 billion in DO] deterrence calculated earlier shows that these
twenty-five private cases alone probably deterred more anticompetitive behavior than the entire
DO] criminal antitrust enforcement.
Another comparison involves only cases in which the government obtained some
sort of relief. This comparison might appeal to those who praise government action and are
skeptical of private enforcement. They might doubt whether the purely private cases were
meritorious. (It is important to note that, for the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, almost all
of the private cases we included have strong indicia of being meritorious.) As Table 8 reflects,
see infra, the plaintiffs in the twenty-four cases validated by some sort of successful government
action recovered between $10.34 and $11.973 billion in nominal dollars. Even the lower of
these amounts is over 150% of the $6.756 billion in nominal dollars in deterrence produced by
every criminal case brought by DOJ during the same period.
Yet another interesting comparison is to the thirteen cases in the Lande/Davis
sample that also involved a DOJ action that resulted in a criminal penalty. These thirteen
private cases yielded $5.6 to $7.0 billion in nominal dollar payments, roughly the same as the
$6.756 billion DOJ nominal dollar total. Of course, it could be argued that a better
comparison might be limited to the deterrence effect of the DOJ action in those thirteen cases,
rather than all of the DO] cases from the same time frame.
Further, the larger, per se sample surely includes some cases that could not have
resulted in criminal penalties, so one could argue that the comparison to only those cases
involving criminal penalties is the fairer one. However, criminal conduct is not the only
anticompetitive conduct; so too is all per se illegal conduct. We should be grateful to the
private cases for discouraging any per se illegal conduct. Finally, DOJ fines must be proven to a
criminal standard, while private cases operate under a civil standard. Perhaps the fairer
comparison is, after all, to the deterrence from the sample of twenty-five per se cases, or to the
deterrence from all forty cases. DOJ did little or nothing to discourage the conduct in many of
these non-criminal cases. The only deterrence came from the private actions.
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our assumed disvalue of $6 million for one year in prison, one could
use a low estimate of $3 million or a high estimate of $12 million for
the disvalue of one year in prison (i.e., $1 million per month).86
Similarly, one could use $1.5 million and $6 million estimates for the
deterrence effects of one year of house arrest instead of our $3
million assumption. Doing this would of course change the total
estimated deterrence effects of the DOJ criminal enforcement
program. Using 2010 dollars, the low estimates would decrease the
$7.737 billion DOJ deterrence estimate to $5.571 billion. The high
estimates would increase the DOJ deterrence estimate to $8.689
billion. 87 These are still much lower than the recovery totals in (and
resulting deterrence from) the private cases. 88
Alternatively, one could ask how much one year in prison and
one year of house arrest have to be disvalued on average for the
deterrence effects of the Antitrust Division's entire criminal anticartel program from 1990 to 2007 to equal the deterrence value of
the forty large private cases from the same period (and, of course,
also considering the corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution
that the DOJ secured). Only if the deterrence effects of prison time
was $43-48 million per year on average (i.e., slightly more than $3.5
to $4.0 million per month), and the deterrence effects of house
arrest was $21.5-24 million per year on average, would the entire
DOJ anti-cartel program produce as much deterrence as these forty
cases. 89

86. Even the $3 million estimate for the disutility associated with one year in prison is
as large as some of the estimates of the value of a life according to some of the studies cited
earlier. See supra notes 27-29. The $12 million estimate would be at the upper end of the
range of estimates of the value of a human life calculated by these studies. See supra notes 2729. (From a philosophical perspective, is one year of the life of a price fixer really "worth" the
same as an average human life?)
87. If we were to use the $12 million figure for the value of one year in prison and $6
million for one year of house arrest, the deterrence value of all the DOJ anti-cartel programs
since 1990 would rise significantly. Using 2010 dollars, the total DOJ deterrence figure would
rise from $7.731 billion to $8.136 billion, more than the amounts that defendants paid in the
thirteen private cases that also had a criminal penalty, but less than the deterrence value of the
twenty-five per se cases in the sample, and less than half of the more than $21billion paid in all
40 cases in the sample. See infra Tables 9 & 10.
88. Even these larger nominal figures yield results that are less than the nominal $9.2 to
$10.6 billion secured by the twenty-five private per se cases, or the nominal $10.34 to $11.973
billion paid in the twenty-four cases that also resulted in government relief, much less the
nominal $18 billion or more from all forty cases.
89. 330.24 years in prison disvalued at $43-48million per year plus 96.85 years of
house arrest disvalued at $21.5-24 million per year, plus the $5.466 billion total for corporate,
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IV. WERE THE PRIVATE CASES MERITORIOUS?

If the criticisms of private antitrust enforcement noted earlier are
correct and private actions often obtain results in cases that lack
merit, not only might they fail to discourage anticompetitive
behavior, they might discourage legal-and beneficial-conduct. In
other words, they might have the opposite of a beneficial deterrence
effect! For several reasons, however, this concern is likely misplaced,
at least with respect to most of the forty cases we studied.
First, even though almost all of the forty cases were only
settlements, it should be recalled that a federal judge approved these
settlements. While this certainly is not the same as a verdict, a diverse
and generally conservative group of federal judges did ratify that the
settlements were fair to members of the plaintiff classes. We note that
of the forty-five federal judges who approved the settlements or
otherwise presided over part or all of the cases we studied, twentyseven were appointed by a Republican president. 90 We also note that
these judges approved these cases during an era where every
Supreme Court antitrust decision has been decided in favor of the
defendant. Each of the last fifteen antitrust decisions, made by a
court rated by Judge Posner as the most conservative since 1930,91
including every case decided after 1992 through 2009, went against
plaintiffs. 92 Given that this tide of pro-defendant instruction
individual fines and restitution, equals $21.7 to $23.6 billion. This is roughly the same as the
private totals of $21.9-$23.9 billion. All figures are calculated using 2010 dollars
90. See infra Table 11.
91. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A
Statistical Study, 6-7, 18, 46 tb1.3 (Univ. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404,
2009), 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.
cfm?abstracUd=1126403.
92. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (9-0 in the
judgment, 5-4 in regard to the Court's opinion); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (5-4 decision); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (9-0); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. 1955 (2007) (7-2); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007) (71); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder·Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (7-2);
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (8-0); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006) (8-0); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004) (9-0); U.S. Postal Servo v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736
(2004) (9-0); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (8-0);
California Dental Ass'n V. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1998); Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
128 (1998); State Oil CO. V. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S.
231 (1996); see Andrew 1. Gavil, Antitrust Book Ends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in
Historical Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2007) ("The last clear plaintiffs' victories in the
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effectively tells the lower courts how to decide close cases, and given
that the high percentage of judges presiding in the litigation we
studied were appointed by Republican presidents, one would not
expect that approval of the class action settlements would be based
on any pre-existing excessive sympathy for plaintiffs' attorneys.93
Second, a large number of the opinions in the forty cases contain
generous and gratuitous praise for the plaintiffs' counsel handling
the case. 94 Of the eight judges from whom we were able to discover
explicit and generous praise for the conduct of plaintiffs' attorneys
(in none of the cases did we discover criticism), five were appointed
by a Republican president. 95 This too helps give assurance that the
cases brought by private counsel generally were in the public interest.
Third, an advantage of our selecting only cases that returned
more than $50 million in cash benefits to victims is that this screens
out nuisance settlements. We are very skeptical about claims that
defending these suits often costs innocent firms $10 million or more.
We would believe this only for very unusual cases. Regardless, $50
million should be well above the nuisance value of an unmeritorious
case. Moreover, the majority of the cases we studied (23/40) settled
for more than $100 million. 96
Fourth, since actions that settle for more than $50 million are
not nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect the
defendants' perception that they could well lose on the merits, not
only at trial but also on appeal. To be sure, some may assert that
defendants settle regardless of the merits of their cases simply
because they are risk averse. This may sometimes be true. Of course,
the risk to which they are averse is that they may lose. Moreover,
plaintiffs-or, in contingency fee cases, plaintiffs' counsel-also tend
to be averse to risk, probably more so than defendants. Plaintiff's
Court occurred in 1992 in two cases, [Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504
U.S. 451 (1992)] and [FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)].").
93. See infra Appendix I, Table 11. We do not mean to suggest that judges act on crass
political commitments in presiding over litigation or that party affiliation correlates perfectly
with attitudes toward plaintiffs in class actions. Our point is that our analysis is supported to
the extent party affiliation might serve as an extremely crude and rough check on whether the
judges in the cases we studied were unduly sympathetic to class counsel's efforts.
94. For examples, see Lande & Davis, Bmefits, supra note·, at 903-04.
95. See id. at 903-04, 914 tbUO.
96. It is difficult for a firm to believably claim, in effect: "We are saints who did
absolutely nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100 million or more just to
make the case go away." While we are not saying this can never happen, as the settlements get
higher, this argument loses credibility.
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lawyers often pay millions of dollars toward the costs of litigationboth in terms of out of pocket expenses and in terms of the implicit
value of thousands of hours of their time-all of which will be
uncompensated if the case proceeds to trial and defendants prevail.
This could give plaintiffs' attorneys an incentive to settle for amounts
that are too low. Defendants' attorneys, by contrast, are paid by the
hour, so they do not have the same kind of risk aversion incentives.
In sum, there is no basis for believing that defendants are more risk
averse than plaintiffs. If anything, we believe the reverse could well
be true. 97 For these reasons, settlement values are at least as likely to
be too low as they are to be too high.98
A final reason to believe that the cases we studied were generally
meritorious is that most were validated in whole or in part by means
other than settlement in private litigation. This validation took
various forms:
1. In thirteen of the forty cases (32.5%), defendants or their
employees were subject to criminal penalties, generally through
guilty pleas.
2. In twelve of the forty cases (30%), government enforcers
obtained a civil recovery, usually in the form of a consent order.
3. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), plaintiffs survived or
prevailed on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary
judgment).
4. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), defendants lost at trial in
the private litigation or in a closely related case.
97. It could be argued that plaintiffs' attorneys sometimes have an incentive to "sell out
their clients" by settling for too Iowan amount, too quickly-that their incentive is just to take
less money than the victims deserve and then to move on to the next case. Moreover, in class
action cases, plaintiffs have difficulty effectively policing their counsel so the possibility of
settlements that are too quick and too low is a serious one. By contrast, it could be argued that
defense lawyers have the incentive to delay and reject reasonable offers and thereby bill as many
hours as possible, even if defendants' clients are in a better position to oversee their attorneys'
activities than plaintiffs. For a further discussion of these issues, see Joshua P. Davis and Eric 1.
Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class
Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS 1.J. 355 (2009); Joshua P. Davis and Eric 1.
Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON 1. REv.
969 (2010).
98. Others may also say that defendants worry that they will lose when they should not.
This raises a philosophical issue. If the courts say conduct violates the antitrust laws, and if an
appellate court, perhaps even the Supreme Court, confirms liability, is it meaningful to say that
the outcome is wrong? For practical purposes, we adopt a positivist's view and suggest that the
law is whatever the ultimate court declares it to be. Any other perspective would make a study
like ours infeasible.
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5. In at least three out of forty cases (7.5%) plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss. 99
In sum, thirty-four of the forty cases (85%) had at least one of
these indicators that plaintiffs' case was meritorious. (This total
would be thirty-three if motions to dismiss are not included. The
percentages appear to total more than 100% because eight of the
forty cases involved more than one basis for validation.) Table 12,
infra, summarizes this information. Table 13, infra, lists the cases in
which the merits received each kind of validation.
Table 12: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Cases
Kind of Validation of Merits

Number of Cases

Criminal Penalty

13 out of 40 (32.5%)

Government Obtained Civil
Relief

12 out of 40 (30%)

Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related
Case

9 out of 40 (22.5%)

Ps Survived or Prevailed at
Summary Judgment

9 out of 40 (22.5%)

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss

3 out 40 (7.5%)

At Least One Basis for Validation

34 out of 40 (85%)

At Least One Basis for Validation,
Not Including Surviving Motion
to Dismiss

33 out of 40 (82.5%)

Ultimately, there is no way to prove or fully refute assertions that
many or most private cases are unmeritorious and are tantamount to
extortion. But the above analysis offers reasons to conclude that all
of the cases we studied involved legitimate claims, and there is no

99. In fact, the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs survived a motion
be higher. We did not consistently note this aspect of the litigation we studied.
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V. QUALIFICATIONS AND CAVEATS
Throughout this article, we have explicitly or implicitly added a
large number of qualifications and caveats to our analysis. Some of
the most important are worth recapitulating briefly so the
conclusions presented in the next section can be assessed fairly.
Concerning DOJ enforcement, corporate criminal fines and all
restitution and payments in private cases are made by the
corporations involved. Prison terms and house arrests (which are
virtually impossible to value accurately) are served by the individuals
involved, and the individual fines are often paid by the individuals
involved. 10o We are adding the deterrence effects of all these together
to arrive at a measure of total deterrence. We are implicitly assuming
that the corporations involved are profit-maximizing and that the
executives involved care what happens to their employers. We
recognize there are agent/principal problems and behavioral
economics issues as well. As noted above, some executives may care
only or primarily about the sanctions directed against them as
individuals; some may care equally what happens to their employer
( either out of professional pride, corporate loyalty, or because of how
a corporate sanction could affect their career); other executives
might care about both, but weigh the individual sanctions more
heavily. To these agent/principal problems, we have arbitrarily
tripled the deterrence effects of the individual sanctions (prison,
house arrest, and fines) compared to the corporate payouts (fines,
restitution, and payouts in private cases).
Concerning private enforcement, the $18-19.6 billion in
payments made in forty large private antitrust cases is only an
extremely low floor on the total deterrence effects of private antitrust
enforcement, for many reasons. While these were among the largest
private antitrust cases brought during the relevant time period, surely
the total paid by defendants in the thousands of private antitrust
cases that ended during this period was many times as large. This

100. For a discussion on whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees are
ultimately paid by the employees, or whether they are often or usually directly or indirectly
paid by their employer, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *.
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total also omitted the deterrence value of the products, discounts,
services, and coupons that were part of the relief in these cases.
Concerning the DOJ/private comparison, the comparison of the
relative deterrence from private and DOJ cases did not attempt to
value the injunctive relief or legal precedent obtained in either type
of case. The deterrence effects of defendants' attorneys' fees and the
stress and time involved for defendants in defending both the DOJ
and the private cases has also been omitted. These are significant
omissions. This Article's analysis assumes the effects of these omitted
factors would be the same for both private enforcement and DOJ
enforcement, but we know of no way to ascertain whether this is
true. lol
Further, reasonable people could dispute who first discovered
some of the violations that gave rise to the sample of forty large
private cases. The Lande/Davis study concluded, on the basis of
admittedly imperfect public information and interviews with
attorneys, that sixteen of these forty cases originally had been
discovered by private parties and their counsel, ten were follow-ons
to government enforcement actions, and the others had mixed or
uncertain origins. This figure for follow-on cases of 10/40, or 25%,
is consistent with a survey by Kauper & Snyder, which found that
only 20% of private cases were follow-on cases. 102 Moreover, at least
nine of the private follow-on cases (9/40 or 22.5%) were
significantly broader than the DOJ case: they involved more
defendants than the DOJ case, more causes of action, greater relief
(in some instances the only relief), or longer periods of illegality. 103
If, contrary to our findings, every one of the forty private
antitrust violations had originally been uncovered by the DOJ (even
private actions where the DOJ never filed a case), this fact would
complicate an analysis of the relative deterrence effects of private and

101. The only indication of the relative value of the precedents that were established
comes from the Calkins study, which concluded that the most important precedents in recent
years were established through private litigation. Calkins, supra note 11.
102. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) ("Although the conventional wisdom has long been
that class actions tend to 'tag along' on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent
study of antitrust litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at '[I Jess
than 20% of private antitrust actions filed between 1976 and 1983.'" (quoting Moore, Data
Galore in Georgetown Damage Study, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4,1985, at 24, col.4)).
103. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 910 tbl.6.
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public antitrust enforcement. The DOJ certainly should get partial
credit for the private recoveries obtained in any cases it uncovered or
helped to uncover, even if the private parties secured the bulk of the
sanctions. 104 Nevertheless, it would not be fair to give the DOJ
complete credit for any resulting deterrence, because if there had
been no private enforcement, this deterrence never would have
arisen. Rather, the fairest thing would be to share credit for this
deterrence between the public and private enforcers.
Another general caveat concerns how, from a deterrence
perspective, perceptions can be more important than the realities this
article has attempted to document. For example, Professor Stephen
Calkins, who is from Detroit, noted the extraordinary prominence in
Michigan of Alfred Taubman. Calkins said that the extensive press
coverage of Mr. Taubman's being sent to (and later released from)
prison for an antitrust offense sent a message to business leaders that
no imaginable fine could equal. 105 In this regard, some of the
stereotypes about private enforcers also could help to deter antitrust
violations. Irwin Stelzer articulated the widely held belief: "An army
of private enforcers, enlisting help from attorney-entrepreneurs free
to accept cases on a contingency fee basis, freed of 'loser pays'
obligations, is an important supplement to those limited
[government] resources.,,106 Although defendants to a large extent
have succeeded in portraying plaintiffs' attorneys as the modern

104. Each type of plaintiff might make a different contribution to the deterrence mix. As
we noted in Global Competition Litigation Review:
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that, as a practical matter the government
cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcing for various
reasons including: budgetary constraints; undue fear of losing cases; lack of
awareness of industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by
'losers' that they were in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover
among government attorneys; and the unfortunate reality that government
enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions are at times politically motivated. Not
surprisingly, a vigorous private antitrust or competition regime is likely to confer
significant benefits over and above those conferred by a system reliant solely upon
government enforcement.
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Of Myths and Evidence: An Analysis of 40 U.S. Cases for
Countries Considering a Private Right of Action for Competition Law Violations, 2 GLOBAL
COMPETITION LITIG. REv. 126,18-19 (2009).
105. Stephen Calkins, Remarks at the George Washington University Law School
Antitrust Conference (Feb. 27,2009).
106. Irwin Stelzer, Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy, Address at the
Office of Fair Trading's Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Oct. 19,
2006).
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economy's bogeymen, their fears of this swarming private "army"
might do a great deal to discourage anticompetitive conduct, despite
the fact that many recent court decisions have weakened private
enforcement substantially.lo7
Finally, this Article is not attempting to perform a cost/benefit
analysis of private antitrust enforcement. Many others have asserted
problems with private enforcement (although without any systematic
evidence), and we readily agree that some private cases have not been
in the public interest. Nevertheless, we believe the debate over
private antitrust enforcement deserves balance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our primary conclusion is that the benefits of private antitrust
enforcement are substantial and underappreciated. The importance
of private enforcement to compensation perhaps requires little
elaboration because there is no meaningful alternative means for
victims of anticompetitive behavior to recover for the harm they
suffered as a result of antitrust violations. Perhaps more surprisingly,
there is evidence that private antitrust enforcement does more than
DOJ criminal enforcement to deter anticompetitive behavior.
It is, of course, extremely difficult to isolate successes in the
antitrust world. Even if a particular private case succeeded in forcing
violators to surrender $100 million or more to their victims, it often
would be reasonable to credit many parties in addition to the victims
and their counsel. A case could rely in whole or in part on a
conspiracy uncovered or partly uncovered by an earlier DOJ
investigation, as well as on a legal precedent established by a State
Attorney General in an unrelated case; and the case itself could have
been financed by private counsel who was able to do so only because
of success in a prior private litigation. As always, success has many
parents. Rather than enter into fruitless arguments about which type
of enforcement is entitled to what percentage of the credit, and,
regardless of whether it is viewed from a deterrence or compensation
perspective, perhaps the safest conclusion is that private enforcement
is an important complement to government enforcement.
Moreover, the cost to the taxpayer of the deterrence and
compensation that arises from private enforcement is practically
nonexistent. The only cost to the taxpayer is the cost of maintaining
107. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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some portion of the judicial system. This amounts to only a tiny
fraction of the benefits of private enforcement and would be incurred
even if all these cases were brought by government enforcers.
In addition, the high success rate of government litigation
suggests that in the absence of private litigation, many bad actors
would get away with violating the antitrust laws. In most cases, if the
law is somewhat unclear, or if the evidence of illegal conduct is not
absolutely compelling at the outset of a legal action, the DOJ does
not seem to be willing to pursue litigation. This may well be the
appropriate approach for the government to take. But it holds the
potential for antitrust laws to go largely unenforced.
Within this context, private litigation of the antitrust laws seems
to play a crucial role. In the United States, the anticompetitive
conduct that gives rise to government enforcement currently occurs
far too frequently, even factoring in the effects of the present system
of private litigation. 108 A fortiori, this conduct would be even more
underdeterred if the United States' eliminated or substantially
curtailed private enforcement. We would be surprised if firms in
other nations were significantly more law abiding than U.S. firms,
and we suspect that the United States' record of underdeterrence of
anticompetitive conduct (and undercompensation of victims) exists
in many if not most other nations as well. Although each nation has
unique needs, history, institutions, capabilities, and circumstances,
and we would never advocate a "one-size-fits-all" approach to
competition legislation, we do urge every nation without private
enforcement of its competition laws to seriously consider permitting
victim suits. 109

108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
109. Europeans often believe that public enforcement should be concerned with
deterrence while private enforcement should be concerned with compensation of victims. See
Wouter P.J. Wils, The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions
for Damages, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 3, passim (2009). We believe that the deterrence
effects of private enforcement should be given greater consideration.
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APPENDIX I: TABLES

Table 1: Total Corporate Antitrust Fines 1990-2007 10

Year (Fiscal)

Total CorI2orate Fines ($000)

1990

22,658

1991

17,573

1992

22,430

1993

40,427

1994

38,996

1995

40,222

1996

25,245

1997

203,931

1998

241,645

1999

959,866

2000

303,241

2001

270,778

2002

93,826

2003

63,752

2004

140,586

2005

595,966

2006

469,805

2007

615,671

Total

4,166,618

110. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 19901999 12, available at hap:!/www.justice.gov/atr/public/246419.pdf (last visited Mar. 18,
2011); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 12.
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Table 2: Total Individual Antitrust Fines 1990-2007 11

Year (Fiscal)

Total Individual Fines ($000)

1990

917

1991

2,806

1992

1,275

1993

1,868

1994

1,240

1995

1,211

1996

1,572

1997

1,247

1998

2,499

1999

12,273

2000

5,180

2001

2,019

2002

8,685

2003

470

2004

644

2005

4,483

2006

3,650

2007

15,109

Total

67,148

Ill. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110 at 12; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SlIpra note
10, at 12.
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Table 3: Total Restitution 1990-200j12

1990

Restitution ImI20sed in Connection
with Criminal Antitrust Cases
($000)
5,670

1991

3,185

1992

3,550

1993

950

1994

4,220

1995

1,200

1996

799

1997

275

1998

4,250

1999

2,343

2000

1,713

2001

31,083

2002

7,278

2003

15,545

2004

18,776

2005

10,371

2006

2,165

2007

4,790

Total

118,163

Year

112. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 12; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
10, at 12.
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Table 4: Total Incarceration 1990-2001 13

Year

Incarceration: Number of Da~s of
Prison Time Sentenced in Antitrust
Division Cases

1990

2,739

1991

6,594

1992

2,488

1993

4,726

1994

1,497

1995

3,902

1996

2,431

1997

789

1998

1,301

1999

6,662

2000

5,584

2001

4,800

2002

10,501

2003

9,341

2004

7,334

2005

13,157

2006

5,383

2007

31,391

Total

120,620
120,620 + 365.25 = 330.24 years

113. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1l0, at 13; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Sltpra note
10, at 13.
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Table 5: Total of Non-Prison Confinement Days (e.g.) House Arrest)
1990-2007 14

Year

Number of Other Confinement
Da):::s Sentenced in Antitrust
Division Cases

1990

632

1991

1,519

1992

1,734

1993

3,552

1994

2,475

1995

2,933

1996

1,148

1997

1,270

1998

1,530

1999

2,850

2000

2,567

2001

1,844

2002

3,607

2003

1,025

2004

1,575

2005

1,270

2006

2,760

2007

1,085

Total

35,376
35,376"," 365.25 = 96.85 years

114. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 13; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
10,at13.
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Table 6: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund lls

Level of Income

Average Award

Number of
Claimants

Total Awards

0

$788,022.03

17

$13,396,374.59

$24,999 or less

$1,102,135.44

163

$179,648,077.33

$25,000 $99,999

$1,520,155.41

1,591

$2,418,567,253.96

$100,000 $199,999

$2,302,234.80

633

$1,457,314,626.24

$200,000 $499,999

$3,394,624.91

310

$1,052,333,721.38

$500,000 $999,999

$4,749,654.40

89

$422,719,241.32

$1,000,000 $1,999,999

$5,671,815.64

52

$294,934,413.48

$2,000,000 $3,999,999

$6,253,705.42

17

$106,312,992.16

$4,000,000+

$6,379,287.70

8

$51,034,301.62

115. See FEINBERG REpORT, supra note 48, at 97 tbl.2. The Fund's report provided the
total amount of compensation for a given income bracket and the total number of claims at
that income level. The average awards were arrived at by dividing the total awards by the
number of claimants at that income level. Id.
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Table 7: Recoveries in Private CaseP6

Case

Recove~

($ millions)

Airline Ticket Commission
Litigation

86

Auction Houses

452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)

Augmentin

91

Automotive Refinishing Paint

106

Buspirone

220

Caldera

275

Cardizem (direct class)

no

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives

77

Conwood

1,050

DRAM

326

Drill Bits

53

EI Paso

1,427 (plus 125 in uncounted rate
reductions)

Flat Glass

122

Fructose

531

Graphite Electrodes

47

IBM

775 (plus 75 in uncounted credit
towards Microsoft software)

Insurance

36

Lease Oil

193

Linerboard

202

116. Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 879, 892 tbl.l (2008). For summaries of
the individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis,
Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies, SSRN,
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1105523 (last modified Mar. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter Illdividual Case Studies].
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Lysine

65

Microcrystalline Cellulose

50

NASDAQ

1,027

NCAA

74

Netscape

750

Paxil

165

Platinol

50

Polypropylene Carpet

50

RealNetworks

478 to 761

Relafen

250

Remeron

75

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Sun

700

Taxol

66

Terazosin

74

Urethane

73

Visa/MasterCard

3,383

Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

18,006 to 19,639
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Table 8: Recoveries in Cases Validated by Government Action

Case

Validation of Merits in
Government Action

Auction Houses

Criminal Penalty

Buspirone

Cardizem

Part of Course of
Conduct Resulting in
FTC Consent Order
Conduct Resulted in FTC
Consent Order

Recove~

($
millions)

452
220

llO

Citric Acid

Criminal Penalty

175

Commercial Explosives

Criminal Penalty

77

DRAM

Criminal Penalty

326

Drill Bits

Criminal Penalty

53

El Paso

FERC Ruling Against D

1,427

Graphite Electrodes

Criminal Penalty

47

IBM

Government Prevailed at
Trial in Related Case

775

Lysine

Criminal Penalty

65

Microcrystalline
Cellulose

FTC Consent Orders

50

Netscape v. Microsoft

Platinol

358

Government Prevailed at
Trial in Related Case
Part of Course of
Conduct Resulting in
FTC Consent Order

750
50
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Polypropylene Carpet

RealNetworks v.
Microsoft

Rubber Chemicals
Sorbates
Specialty Steel

Sun v. Microsoft

Taxol
Terazosin

Criminal Penalty

50

EU Preliminary Findings
iAgainst D in Related Case
and U.S. Government
Prevailed at Trial in
Somewhat Related Case

478 to 761

Criminal Penalty

268

Criminal Penalty

96

Criminal Penalty

50

Government Prevailed at
Trial in Related Case
Part of Course of
Conduct Resulting in
FTC Consent Order
Government Obtained
Injunctive Relief

700
66

74

Urethane

Criminal Penalty

73

Vitamins

Criminal Penalty

3,908 to 5,258

Total

10,340 to 11,973
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Table 9: Recoveries in Per Se CaseP7

Case

Recove~

Airline Ticket Commission
Litigation

86

Auction Houses

452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)

Automotive Refinishing Paint

106

Cardizem (direct class)

110

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives

77

Conwood

1,050

DRAM

326

Drill Bits

53

Flat Glass

122

Fructose

531

Graphite Electrodes

47

Insurance

36

Lease Oil

193

Linerboard

202

Lysine

65

Microcrystalline Cellulose

50

NASDAQ

1,027

Polypropylene Carpet

50

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Terazosin

74

117. Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 913 tb1.9.

360

($ millions)

315

Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement
Urethane

73

Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

9,227 to 10,577

Table 10: Recoveries for Cases with a Criminal Penalty as Welllls

Case

Recoven:: ($ millions)

Auction Houses

452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives

77

DRAM

326

Drill Bits

53

Graphite Electrodes

47

Lysine

65

Polypropylene Carpet

50

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Urethane

73

Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

6,171 to 7,521

118. Id. at 914 tbl.ll.
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Table 11: Judges Presiding Over Private Litigation by Case and
Appointing Presiden-r 19

Iudge

Case

James
Rosenbaum
Lewis A. Kaplan
Henry Coke
Morgan
Terrell Hodges

Airline Tickets
Commission
Auction House
Augmentin
Automotive
Refinishing

Nominated
BS
Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton
George H. W.
Bush
Richard
Nixon

Political Party
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican

John F. Keenan
Morey L. Sear

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Gerald Ford

Republican

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Bruce M. Selya
Julia Smith
Gibbons
D. Lowell Jensen

J. Frederick Motz

John G. Koeltl

Buspirone

Dee Benson

Caldera

Nancy G.
Edmunds

Cardizem

Fern M. Smith

Citric Acid

Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton
George H.W.
Bush
George H.W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan

Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican

119. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (follow "Judges of the United States Courts"
hyperlink, then search for judges by name) (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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David Sam
Thomas B.
Russell
Phyllis Hamilton
John V.
Singleton
Richard Haden
(San Diego Sup.
Court)
Donald Emil
Ziegler /
Donettta W.
Ambrose
Michael M.
Mihm
Charles R.
Weiner
Colleen KollarKetelly
Willian W.
Schwarzer

Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement
Commercial
Explosives

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Conwood

Bill Clinton

Democrat

DRAM

Bill Clinton
Lyndon B.
Johnson

Democrat

El Paso

N/A

N/A

Flat Glass

Jimmy Carter
/ Bill Clinton

Democrat/
Democrat

Drill Bits

Fructose
Graphite
Electrodes
IBM
Insurance

Ronald
Reagan
Lyndon B.
Johnson
Ronald
Reagan
Gerald Ford

Democrat

Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican

Jan E. Dubois

Linerboard

Milton 1. Shadur
Thomas Newman
O'Neill, Jr.

Lysine
Microcrystalline
Cellulose

Kathryn H. Vratil

NCAA

Thomas Penfield
Jackson
Janis Graham
Jack

Netscape v.
Microsoft

Ronald
Reagan
Jimmy Carter
Ronald
Reagan
George H.W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan

Oil Lease

Bill Clinton

Democrat

John Padova

Paxil

George H.W.
Bush

Republican

Emmit G.
Sullivan

Platinol

Bill Clinton

Democrat

Harold Murphy

Polypropylene
Carpet

Jimmy Carter

Democrat

Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
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Frederick Motz
Reginald C.
Lindsay
Faith Hochberg
Terrell Hodges
Maxine M.
Chesney
Norman W.
Black
Frederick Motz
Emmet G.
Sullivan
Patricia A. Seitz
John W.
Lungstrom
John Gleeson
Thomas Francis
Hogan

2011

RealNetwoks v.
Microsoft

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Relafen

Bill Clinton

Democrat

Remeron
Rubber
Chemicals

Bill Clinton
Richard
Nixon

Democrat

Sorbates

Bill Clinton

Democrat

Specialty Steel

Jimmy Carter

Democrat

Sun v. Microsoft
Taxol
Terazosin
Urethane
Visa/MasterCard
Vitamins

Ronald
Reagan
Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton
George H.W.
Bush
Bill Clinton
Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Total
Republicans: 27
Total
Democrats: 18
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Table 13: Summary of Validation of Merits in Individual Casepo

Case

Validation of Merits

Airline Tickets Commission

None Reported

Auction Houses

Criminal Penalty

Augmentin

Rulings against Ds on Underlying
Patent Issues in Related Cases

Automotive Refinishing

None Reported

Buspirone

Part of Course of Conduct Resulting
in FTC Consent Order

Caldera

Survive SJ

Cardizem

Partial SJ for Ps on Per Se Issue
(AfPd on Appeal) and Conduct
Resulted in FTC Consent Order

Citric Acid

Criminal Penalty

Commercial Explosives

Jury Verdict Against Ds by
competitor, Criminal Penalty

Conwood

Jury Verdict Against D (AfPd on
Appeal)

DRAM

Survived SJ and Criminal Penalty

Drill Bits

Criminal Penalty

EI Paso

FERC Ruling Against D

120. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note·.
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Flat Glass

SJ Against Ps Overruled on Appeal

Fructose

SJ Against Ps Overruled on Appeal

Graphite Electrodes

Criminal Penalty

IBM

Government Prevailed at Trial in
Related Case

Insurance

Dismissal Reversed in Appellate
Court (Aff'd by USSC)

Linerboard

None Reported (Other than Class
Certification)

Lysine

Criminal Penalty

Microcrystalline Cellulose

FTC Consent Orders

NCAA

SJ for Ps on Liability (Aff'd on
Appeal)

Netscape v. Microsoft

Government Prevailed at Trial in
Related Case

Oil Lease

None Reported

Paxil

Platinol
Polypropylene Carpet

RealNetworks v. Microsoft
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in FTC Consent Order
Criminal Penalty
EU Preliminary Findings Against D
in Related Case and u.s.
Government Prevailed at Trial in
Somewhat Related Case
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Relafen

Ruling against D on Underlying
Patent Issues in Related Case (AfPd
on Appeal) and Ps Survive Motion
to Dismiss and for SJ and Prevail on
Motion ofIssue Preclusion
Regarding Patent Validity

Remeron

None Reported

Rubber Chemicals

Criminal Penalty

Sorbates

Criminal Penalty

Specialty Steel

Criminal Penalty and Ps Survived
Motions to Dismiss

Sun v. Microsoft

Government Prevailed at Trial in
Related Case

Taxol
Terazosin

Part of Course of Conduct Resulting
in FTC Consent Order
Partial SJ for Ps on Per Se Issue and
Government Obtained Injunctive
Relief

Urethane

Criminal Penalty

Visa/MasterCard

Ps Prevailed on SJ and Defeated SJ

Vitamins

Criminal Penalty and Jury Verdict
Against Non-Settling D
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Table 14: Present Value (in 2010 dollars) of the Recoveries in the Forty
Private CaseP 1

#

1

2

3

Case Name
In re Airline Ticket
Commission
Litigation, 1996 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS 20361 (D.
Minn. Aug 12,
1996); 1996-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) P71,552
In re Auction Houses
Antitrust Litigation,
164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y.2001),
afJ'd, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15327 (2d
Cir. 2002) and
Kruman v. Christie's
International PLC,
284 F.3d 384
(2d Cir. 2002)
Ryan-House et al. v.
GlaxoSmithKline
PLC, C.A.
Doc. No. 2:02cv442
(E.D.Va.2004);SAJ
Distributors, Inc. and
Stephen L. Lafrance
Holdings, Inc. v.
SmithKline Beecham
Corp., Doc. No.

Year/Page
Found

Settlement
Amount
(Before
CPIjPPI)

2010
Dollars
(CPI)

1997/pg.9

$86.1 Million

$117.0
Million

$412 Million
(Cash)
(Domestic)

(Dom)
$521.7
Million

$40 Million
(Cash)
(Foreign)

(For.)
$47.4
Million

$62.5 Million
(Direct)
$29 Million
(Indirect)

(Direct)
$72.2
Million
(Indir.)
$33
Million

Domestic
Class
(2000)/pg.
15
Foreign Class
(2003)/pg.
16

Direct Class
(2004)/pg.
22
Indirect Class
(2004)/pg.
23

121. All data taken from Individual Case Studies, supra note 116. Present values
calculated using CPI Inflation Calculator. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69.
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2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa
filed Nov. 30,2004)

4

5

6

7

In re Automotive
Refinishing Paint
Antitrust Litigation,
177 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
15,2001)
In re Buspirone
Antitrust Litigation)
185 F. Supp. 2d 340
(S.D.N.Y.2002)
MDLDoc. No.
1413, and In re
Buspirone Patent
Litigation, 185 F.
Supp.2d 363
(S.D.N.Y.2002).
Final Settlement
approval at 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26538, (S.D.N.Y
April 17,2003).
(BuSpar)
Caldera, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.,
Case No.
2:96CV645B, 72
F.Supp.2d 1295 (D.
Utah 1999)
In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL Docket No.
1278; 105 F.Supp 2d
682 (E.D. Mich.
2000); 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2003)

(settlements
went on for a
period of 5-6
years;
$105.75
however the
Million
last
settlement
was 2007)
2007L2g. 30

$111.24
Million

2003/pg.38

$220 Million

$260.7
Million

2000/pg.43

$275 Million

$348.2
Million

2004/pg.54

$110 Million

$127.0
Million
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In re Citric Acid
Antitrust Litigation,
1997/pg.58
MDL Docket No.
8
1998/pg. 58
1092; 996 F. Supp.
951 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
In re Commercial
Explosives Litigation,
9
1998/pg.61
945 F. Supp. 1489
JD. Utah 1996)
Trial
Conwood Co. v.
2000/pg. 70
United States
Appeal/
10 Tobacco Co., 290
Trebling
F.3d 768 (6th Cir.
2002/ pg.
2002)
70
In re Dynamic
Random Access
Memory (DRAM)
Antitrust Litigation,
Master File No. M11
2007/pg.75
02-1486PJH, MDL
No. 1486,2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 39841
(N.D. Cal. June 5,
2006)
Natural Gas Antitrust
Cases I, II, III & IV.
Sweetie's, et al. v. El
Paso Corp., No.
319840 (S.F. Super.
Ct. filed Mar. 20,
2001); Continental
12 Forge Company v.
2003/pg.82
Southern California
Gas Co., No.
BC237336 (L.A.
Super. Ct. Sept. 25,
2000); Berg v.
Southern California
Gas Co., No.

370

2011

$86.2 Million
$89 Million

$234.1
Million

$113 Million

$151.2
Million

$1.05 Billion

$1.27
Billion

$326 Million

$342.9
Million

$551 Million
(cash + stock)
$876 Million
(semi-annual
cash)

$653.04
Million
$1.038
Billion
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BC241951 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Dec.
18,2000); City of
Long Beach v.
Southern California
Gas Co., No.
BC247114 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Mar.
20,2001); City of
L.A. v. Southern
California Gas Co.,
No. BC265905 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Mar.
20,2001); Phillip v.
EI Paso Merchant
Energy LP, No. GIC
759425
(San Diego Super.
Ct. filed Dee. 13,
2000); and Phillip v.
EI Paso Merchant
Energy LP, No. GIC
759426 (San Diego
Super. Ct. filed Dee.
13,2000). (EI Paso)
In re Flat Glass
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL 1200, Master
13
Docket Mise. 970550, 191 F.R.D.
472 (W.D. Pa. 1999)
In re Fructose
Antitrust Litigation,
M.D.L. File 1087,
14 Master File # 941577 (Michael
Mihm) (C.D. Ill.
1995)
In re Graphite
15
Electrodes Antitrust

2005/pg.93

$121.7
Million

$136.0
Million

2004/pg.99

$531 Million

$613
Million

2003/pg.
102

$47 Million

$55.7
Million
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Litigation, 2003 WL
22358491 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 9,2003)
16

IBM v. Microsoft

2005/pg.
107

In re Insurance
Antitrust Litigation,
723 F. Supp. 464
(N.D. Cal. 19989);
1995/pg.
17 revJd, 938 F. 2d 919
113
(9th Cir. 1991); affd
sub nom Hartford Ins.
Co. v. California, 509
u.s. 764 (1993)
In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1261,
2000 WL 1475559,
at *1-3 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 4, 2000)
("Linerboard I" ); In
re Linerboard
Antitrust Litigation,
203 F.R.D. 197,
2004/pg.
18 201-04 (E.D. Pa.
116
2001) ("Linerboard
II"); In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litigation,
305 F.3d 145, 14749 (3d Cir. 2002)
("Linerboard III");
In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litigation,
321 F.Supp 2d 619
(E.D. Pa. 2004)
In re Amino Acid
1996/pg.
Lysine Antitrust
121
19 Litigation, MDL No. 1997/pg
1083,918 F. Supp.
121 (federal
1190 (N.D. Ill.
class and two

372

$775 Million
lcashl

$865.3
Million

$36 Million

$51.5
Million

$202.5
Million

$233.8
Million

$45 Million
(major
defendants)
$5 Million
(two

$62.5
Million
(Major)
$6.8
Million

315

Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement
1996).

In re Microcrystalline
Cellulose Antitrust
20 Litigation, MDL No
1402,221 F.R.D.
428 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
InreNASDAQ
Market-Makers
Antitrust Litigation,
21 M.D.L. No, 1023,
No. 94 Civ. 3996
(RWS) (S.D.N.Y.
1998)
Law v. National
Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n., 902 F. Supp.
1394 (D.Kan. 1995);
22 affd, 134 F. 3d 1010
(lOth Cir. 1998);
rev'd, 938 F.2d 919
(9th Cir. 1991)

23

North Shore
Hematology &
Oncology Associates
v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., Civil
Action
No.l:04cv248(EGS)
(D.D.C. filed Feb.

defendants )

defendants)
$15 Million
(estimate for
state opt-out
plaintiffs)
$15 Million
(federal class
and opt-out
payments)

(Two)
$20.4
Million
(state
opt-out)
$20.4
Million
(federal
class and
opt-out)

2005/pg.
128
2003/pg.
129

$25 Million
$25 Million

$27.9
Million
$29.6
Million

1998/pg.
133

$1.027 Billion

$1.374
Billion

2000/pg.
139

$74.5 Million

$94.3
Million

2004/pg.
140

$50 Million

$57.7
Million
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24

25

26

27

28

374

13,2004) (Platinol)
In re Lease Oil
Antitrust Litigation
(No. II), 186 F.R.D.
403 (S.D. Tex.
1999),142 Oil &
Gas Rep. 532 (1999)
Netscape Comm.
Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp., Per Local Civil
Rule 40.5, Related to
Civil Action Nos. 981232 and 98-1233
(D.D.C.
2002)(a/k/a AOL v.
Microsoft)
Oncology &
Radiation Associates
v. Bristol-Meyers
Squibb Co., Case No.
1 :04CV00248
(D.D.C.) (Taxol)
Stop N Shop
Supermarket
Company, et al. v.
Smithkline Beecham
Corp. Civil Action
No.03-CV-4578
(E.D. Pa. filed Aug.
6,2003), and;
Nichols v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No.
00-CV-6222 (E.D.
Pa. Jan 23, 2003)
(Paxil)
In re Polypropylene
Carpet Antitrust
Litigation, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D.
Ga. 2000)

20ll

1999/pg.
144

$193.5
Million

$253.3
Million

2003/pg.
152

$750 Million

$888.8
Million

2003/pg.
158

$65.8 Million

$78.0
Million

2005/pg.
163,165

$165 Million

$184.2
Million

200l/pg.
171

$49.7 Million

$61.2
Million
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RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., Civil
Action No. JFM-0429
968, MDL Docket
No. 1332 (D. Md.)
(2005 settlement)
Red Eagle Resources,
et al. v. Baker Hughes
Inc., et al.,
No.4:91cv00627
30
(Docket) (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 11,1991) (In re
Drill Bits Antitrust
Litigation)
In re Relafen
Antitrust Litigation,
Civil Action No. 0112239-WGY; 346 F.
31
Supp. 2d 349 (D.
Mass. 2004); 231
F.R.D. 52 (D. Mass.
2005)
In re Remeron
Antitrust Litigation,
2005 U.S. Dist.
32
LEXIS 27013
(D.N.I. Nov. 9,
2005)
In re Rubber
Chemicals Antitrust
Litigation, 350
F.Supp.2d 1366
33 (J.P.M.L. 2004),
2005-1 Trade Cases
P 74,804
(J.P.M.L.2004) (No.
MDL 1648)
In re Sorbates Direct
34 Purchaser Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL

2005/pg.
175

$478-$761
Million

$533.7$849.7
Million

1993/pg.
181
1994/pg.
181

$45.4 Million
$8 Million

$68.5
Million
$11.7
Million

2004/pg.
$175 Million
188, Indirect
(Direct)
2005
pg.
$75 Million
190-91
(Indirect)

$202.0
Million
$83.7
Million

2005/pg.
194

$75 Million

$83.7
Million

2005/pg.
202, Bayer
2006/pg.
202, Flexsys

$250.4
Million
(Bayer)
$18.5 Million
(Flexsys)

$279.6
Million
$20
Million

$96.5 Million

$117
Million

2002/pg.
207
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31655191 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 15,2002)
Sun Microsystems v.
35 Microsoft, 333 F.3d
517 (4th Cir. 2003)
In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation
Case No.
99-MDL-1317Seitz/Klein, a/k/a
Louisiana Wholesale
Drug Co., Inc. v.
36 Abbot Laboratories,
et al. S.D. Fla. Case
no. 98-3125, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D.
Fla. 2005) and Valley
Drug Co. v. Abbot
Laboratories, et al.,
S.D. Fla.
Case No. 99-7143
Transamerican
Refining Corp. v.
Dravo Corp., et al.,
No. 4:88CV00789
(Docket) (S.D.Tex.
37
Mar. 10, 1988)
(Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust
Litigation) (1992
settlement)
In re Urethane
Antitrust Litigation,
38 MDL No. 1616,232
F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan.
2005)
In re Visa
39 Check/MasterMoney
Antitrust Litigation,

376

2011

2004/pg.
211

$700 Million

$808
Million

2002/pg.
213

$74.5 Million

$90.3
Million

1992/pg.
221

$50 Million

$77.7
Million

2006/pg.
228

$73.3 Million
(Chemical 1
$18M)
(Chemical 2
$55.3)

$79.3
Million

2003/pg.
233

$3.383 Billion

$4.009
Billion
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a/k/a Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. et. al v.
Visa U.S.A. Inc. and
MasterCard
International Inc.,
396 F.3d 96,114 (2d
Cir.2005)

40

In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litigation
(many related cases)

Total

2003/pg.
242
(conservative
average of
settlement
dates)
In 2010
Dollars

$4.2-$5.6
Billion

$4.977$6.636
Billion

$21.887-$23.862 Billion
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Table 15: Present Value (in 2010 dollars) of Sanctions Imposedfrom
1990-2007

#

Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Totals

14

15
16
17
18

Sanction 122 Amounts
Before cpr ($000)
31,079
29,176
29,805
46,981
46,936
45,055
30,760
207,947
253,392
999,028
320,494
307,918
127,159
80,707
161,244
619,786
482,920
665,788
4,486,175

2010 Dollars
(CPp23)( 100Q)

51,942
46,793
46,405
71,021
69,181
64,579
42,825
283,014
339,575
1,309,884
406,553
379,793
154,400
95,813
186,458
693,218
523,257
701,421
5,466,132

122. All data taken from Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence
from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the u.s. Antitrust Laws,
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=1565693 (last revised September 9,
2010). These figures represent the combined totals of corporate antitrust fines, individual
antitrust fines, and restitution from 1990-2007. The individual antitrust fines were tripled. For
explanation, see Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement
of the U.s. Antitrttst Laws, Section IV.
123. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69.
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APPENDIX II: TABLE A AND ACCOMPANYING NOTES

Table A: Monetary Valuation of Prison Time Established Through
False Imprisonment Litigation.
How
Finalized?
Phone
$9,000,000.00
$10,800,000.00
Raul Ramirez 10 months
(settlement)
interview
Phone
$355,500.00 $4,266,000.00
George Jones 1 month
interview
$327,500.00
Phone
Kerry
$3,875,416.66
30 days
(settlement)
interview
Edwards
Mark Diaz
Phone
1,179 days $3,758,976.90 $1,164,517.36
Bravo
interview
Plaintiff

Sentence

James
Newsome

15 years

Total Award

Award 12er ~ear

$15,000,000.00 $1,000,000.00

Phone
interview

Stephan
Cowans

6.5 years

$3,200,000.00
(settlement)

$492,307.69

Published
case

Ellen Maria
Reasonover

16 years

$7,500,000.00
(settlement)

$468,750.00

Published
case

Eddie Joe
Lloyd

17 years

$6,000,000.00
(settlement)

$352,941.17

Published
case

Neil Miller

10.5 years

$3,200,000.00
(settlement)

$304,761.91

Published
case

Larry Mayes

21 years

$214,285.72

Published
case

Eduardo
Velazquez

14 years

$175,000.00

Published
case

$4,500,000.00
(settlement)
$ 2,450,000.00
(settlement)
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Bruce
Godschalk
Clarence
Elkins

2011

15 years

$2,340,000.00
(settlements)

$156,000.00

Published
case

7 years

$ 1,075,000.00
(settlement)

$153,571.43

Published
case

Olmedo
Hidalgo

14 years

$2,000,000.00
(settlement)

$142,857.15

Published
case

Kerry Kotler

10 years 8
months

$1510000.00

$141,563.39

Published
case

Robinson

14 years

$1,750,000.00
(settlement)

$125,000.00

Published
case

Michael
Green

13 years

$16,00,000.00
(settlement)

$123,076.92

Published
case

$ 1,958,454.00
(settlement)

$100,433.54

Published
case

$400,000.00
(settlement)

$23,529.41

Published
case

Darryl Hunt 19.5 years
Stephen Avery 17 years

Notes for Table A-Following is a list of cases included in Table
A. This contains the researcher's methodology notes and other
general case notes.
1. Raul Ramirez. 124 The verdict in this case was $18 million
dollars, but it settled for $9 million. I25 Ramirez was a twenty-fiveyear-old special education teacher .126 Eight months after the
attempted rape of a sixteen -year-old girl, the police arrested Raul
Ramirez, who spent ten months incarcerated awaiting trial. I27 He
was found factually innocent and sued for false arrest and malicious
prosecution.l2 8 This case was cited in Limone v. United States as one
of several cases in recent years where courts have awarded

124. Telephone Interview with Mark Arran, attorney for Plaintiff Raul Ramirez (Oct. 28,
2009). This case settled in early 2006. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
127. See id. at 1212.
128. See id.

380

315

Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement

compensation of more than $1,000,000.00 per year of wrongful
incarceration. 129
2. George Jones. 130 The defendant fully satisfied this
judgment. l3l We include only the false imprisonment portion of
$355,500 and exclude the $71,100 for false arrest, $71,100 for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, $213,300 for malicious
prosecution, $90,000 in punitive damages,132 and $271,188.75 in
attorneys' fees.133 The police failed to turn over exculpatory evidence
in a rape and murder case against George Jones, who was a high
school student at the time of arrest. 134 This case was found via a
citation by the district court in Limone. 135
3. Kerry Edwards.136 The settlement is ambiguous as to the
portion of the award pertaining to false imprisonment and the
portion of the award pertaining to civil rights violations. 137 Kerry
Edwards was misidentified as the subject of an arrest warrant and
held for thirty days.13s At Edwards's insistence, an independent
investigator wrote a report within three days confirming that
Edwards had been misidentified. However, the report was ignored
for several weeks while Edwards continued to be incarcerated. 139 This
verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search.140

129. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243-44 (D. Mass. 2007), ajrd,
579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009).
130. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
131. Telephone Interview with John L. Stainthorp, attorney for Plaintiff George Jones,
People's Law Office (Oct. 8, 2009).
132. Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 83 C 2430, 1987 WL 19800, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
10,1987).
133. Id. at *4.
134. Jones, 856 F.2d at 988-89.
135. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143,244 (D. Mass. 2007), affd, 579
F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009).
136. Edwards v. Freehold Twp., No. 3:07CV043763-MLC-TJB, 2006 WL 4587710
(D.N.J. 2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
137. See Complaint at, Edwards, No. 3:07CV043763-MLC-TJB, 2007 WL 3388973
(D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2007).
138. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Mallon, Anorney for Kerty Edwards, Law
Offices of Thomas J. Mallon (Aug. 3,2009).
139. Id.
140. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
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4. Mark Diaz Bravo. 141 This award was satisfied by the
defendant. 142 The total award of $3,758,976 was calculated by
taking the $3,000.00 per day awarded by the court for 1,179 days in
prison and adding the court's $221,976.00 award for lost
earnings. 143 An award of $1,000,000 for time spent in prison before
conviction was not included in our calculations.144 Mark Diaz Bravo
was a nurse falsely convicted of raping a patient. 14S This case was
cited by the Limone case. 146
5. James Newsome. 147 The award was fully satisfied. 148 In
addition to $1,000,000 per year of imprisonment, the jury awarded
$850,000 total in attorneys' fees, which we did not include in our
calculations. 149 The jury found that officers violated Newsome's civil
rights by inducing three witnesses to falsely testifY against him. ISO
James Newsome was an unemployed paralegal at the time of arrest.
However, although he testified that he was still employed, the court
held that this did not require a new trial. lSI This case was cited by the
Limone case .IS2
6. Stephen Cowans. IS3 Although Cowans only served 6.5 years,
he was sentenced to 35-50 years for murder, which was a factor in
the amount of the settlement. IS4 The Boston police department used
faulty finger printing techniques as evidence at plaintifPs trial.
Plaintiff was released as a result of DNA testing released by the New
England Innocence Project in January 2004. That same year,
Boston's finger printing department was closed for two years. It
141. Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18,2002).
142. Telephone Interview with Tonia Ibanez, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Oct. 9, 2009).
143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
144. Seeid.
145. See Bravo, 2002 WL 31547001, at *1.
146. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143,243-44 (D. Mass. 2007), ajf'd, 579
F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009).
147. Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003).
148. Telephone Interview with Sean Gallagher, Attorney for Plaintiff, Bartlit, Beck,
Herman, Palenchar & Scott (Oct. 9, 2009).
149. Newsome, 319 F.3d at 303.
150. See id. at 302.
151. Id. at 307.
152. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143,243-44 (D. Mass. 2007), ajf'd, 579
F.3d 79, 106 (1st Cir. 2009)
153. Cowans v. City of Boston, No. l:05-CV-1l574-RGS, 2006 WL 4286744 (D.
Mass. Aug. 4,2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. sertlement summary).
154. See id.
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reopened in 2006 after heavy audits of its internal procedures. ISS
This verdict summary was found through a Westlaw verdict search.lS6
7. Ellen Maria Reasonover. 157 Reasonover was falsely convicted
of murder at an unfair trial where hearsay evidence was allowed. Her
conviction was overturned, and she settled her case with the city.
Found through a Westlaw verdict search.lS8
8. Eddie Joe Lloyd. 1s9 Lloyd was exonerated by DNA evidence
of the rape and murder of a sixteen-year-old girl. 160 This settlement
summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search. 161
9. Neil Miller. 162 Miller was exonerated by DNA evidence. 163
This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict
search.lM
10. Larry Mayes. 16s Originally, a jury verdict of $9,000,000 was
reached, but was appealed by Defendant. The Seventh Circuit stayed
its judgment on appeal to allow the parties to settle the case for
$4,500,000. 166 This verdict summary was found by running a
Westlaw verdict search. 167

155. See id.
156. Databases: ]V-NAT, LRP-]V, VS-]V. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
157. Reasonover v. City of Dellwood, No. 4:01-cv-01210-CEJ, 1000 WL 81189 (E.D.
Mo. no date given) (Jury Verdict Reports settlement summary).
158. Databases: ]V-NAT, LRP-]V, VS-]V. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
159. Lloyd v. City of Detroit, No. 2:04-CV-70922-GER-SDP, 2006 WL 2062011 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 1,2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
160. Seeid.
161. Databases: ]V-NAT, LRP-]V, VS-]V. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
162. Miller v. Boston, No. 1:03CVI0805JLT, 2006 WL 4111728 (D. Mass. Mar. 9,
2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
163. See id.
164. Databases: ]V-NAT, LRP-]V, VS-]V. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment"
"wrongful confinement" "false imprisonment" "malicious prosecution" "wrongful arrest" on
June 1,2009.
165. Mayes v. City of Hammond, No. 2:03-CV-379-PRC, 2008 WL 3874685 (N.D.
Ind. Aug. 15,2008).
166. Mayes v. City of Hammond, 290 Fed. App'x 945, 946 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008).
167. Database: ]V-NAT, LRP-]V, VS-]V. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
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11. Eduardo Vehizquez. 168 Prior to this action, Eduardo
Velazquez had filed and settled a lawsuit under Massachusetts'
exoneration statute 169 for the statutory maximum of $500,000. 170
The police failed to disclose exonerating evidence. l7l This settlement
summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search.172
12. Bruce Godschalk. l73 Godschalk was a twenty-six-year-old
landscaper at the time of conviction. 174 This case was cited in a
footnote in a law review article. 175
13. Clarence Elkins.176 Elkins was exonerated by DNA testing. l77
This verdict summary was found by performing a Westlaw verdict
search. 178
14. Olmedo Hidalgo. 179 Hidalgo was convicted of murder
despite what he claimed to be overwhelming evidence of his
innocence that was withheld. 180 This verdict summary was found by
running a Westlaw verdict search. l8l

168. Velazquez v. City of Chicopee, 226 F.R.D. 31 (D. Mass. 2004).
169. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, §§ 1-9 (2006).
170. Velazquez v. City of Chicopee, 3:03-CV-30249-MAP, 2005 WL 3839494 (D.
Mass. 2005) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
171. Velazquez, 226 F.R.D. at 32-33.
172. Databases: IV-NAT, LRP-IV, VS-IV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
173. Godschalk v. Montgomery Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 02-6745, 2003 WL
22998364 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary) (discussing
$740,000 settlement with the district attorney's office); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence,
Wrongful Error, and Wrongfol Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REv. 35,43 n.30 (discussing
both the aforementioned settlement and a $1,600,000 settlement with the township).
174. See Godschalk, 2003 WL 22998364.
175. Garrett, supra note 173, at 43 n.30.
176. Elkins v. Ohio, No. CR-98-06041, 2006 WL 3827191 (Ohio Com. PI. 2006)
(Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
177. See id.
178. Databases: IV-NAT, LRP-IV, VS-IV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
179. Hidalgo v. City of New York, No. 06 ClY. 13118,2009 WL 1199430 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary).
180. See id.
181. Databases: IV-NAT, LRP-IV, VS-IV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
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15. Kerry Kotler. 182 Kotler, who had been convicted of rape, was
exonerated by DNA evidence. 183 Kotler sued for unjust conviction
and imprisonment under the state statute. 184 This case was cited in a
footnote in a law review article. 18s
16. Robinson. 186 Plaintiff alleged failure to properly train and
hire officers and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. 187 This
settlement summary was found by performing a Westlaw search. 188
17. Michael Green. 189 Plaintiff was exonerated of rape via DNA
evidence 190 because an analysis of a rag said to contain Plaintiff's
semen had been fabricated. 191 As part of the settlement, the city
agreed to reopen the more than one hundred cases in which the lab
technician had testified. l92 This verdict summary was found by
running a Westlaw verdict search. 193
18. Darryl Hunt. 194 Plaintiff was exonerated through DNA
evidence and a confession by another inmate. 195 This settlement
summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search. 196
19. Stephen Avery.197 Avery was exonerated by DNA evidence. 198
Avery's case probably settled very low because he was accused of a

182. Kotler v. State, 680 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
183. See id. at 587.
184. See N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8-b (McKinney 2007). There is no statutory
maximum on the amount of an award under this statute. See § 8-b 6.
185. Garrett, supra note 173, at 44 n.32.
186. Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, JVR No. 491391, 2007 WL 5476226 (S.D. Cal.
2008) (LRP Publications settlement summary).
187. See id.
188. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1, 2009.
189. Green v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:03-CV-00906, 2004 WL 1574178 (N.D. Ohio
June 7, 2004) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment"
"wrongful confinement" "false imprisonment" "malicious prosecution" "wrongful arrest" on
June 1,2009.
194. Hunt. v. North Carolina, JAS NC Ref. No. 231251 WL, 2007 WL 2791826 (N.C.
Super. Feb. 16,2007) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
195. See id.
196. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1,2009.
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second murder before this case settled. I99 The verdict summary was
found by running a Westlaw verdict search. 20o
APPENDIX III

Following is a list of the forty cases included in this Study and the
researchers who analyzed them. 20I
1. In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20361 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1996). Tara Shoemaker.
2. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327 (2d Cir. July
30, 2002); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.
2002). Douglas Richards.
3. Ryan-House v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33711 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2005); SAJ Distribs., Inc., v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No. 2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 30, 2004)
(Augmentin). Michael Einhorn.
4. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Maarten Burggraaf & Andrew Sullivan.
5. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d
363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), final settlement approval, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26538 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,2003). Morgan Anderson & Erika
Dahlstrom.
6. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.
Utah 1999). Tara Shoemaker & Erica Dahlstrom.
7. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682
(E.D. Mich. 2000), affd, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). Morgan
Anderson.

197. Avery v. Manitowoc Co., No. 04-C986, 2006 WL 3955911 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (Law
Bulletin Publishing Co. settlement summary).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: "wrongful imprisonment,"
"wrongful confinement," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," and "wrongful
arrest" on June 1, 2009.
201. For complete case analyses, see ROBERT H. LANDE & JOSHUA P. DAVIS, BENEFITS
FROM PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF FORTY CASES (2007), available
at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10990.
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8. In re Citric Acid Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal.
1998). Bobby Gordon.
9. In re Commercial Explosives Litig., 945 F. Supp. 1489 (D.
Utah 1996). Ruthie Linzer.
10. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.
2002). Erika Dahlstrom.
11. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006).
Erika Dahlstrom.
12. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV: Sweetie's v. EI
Paso Corp., No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001);
Cont'l Forge Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC237336 (L.A. Super.
Ct. filed Sept. 25, 2000); Berg v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC241951
(L.A. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 18,2000); City of Long Beach v. S. Cal.
Gas Co., No. BC247114 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20,2001); City
of L.A. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC265905 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed
Mar. 20, 2001); Phillip v. EI Paso Merch. Energy LP, No. GIC
759425 (San Diego Super. Ct. filed Dec. 13, 2000); Phillip v. EI
Paso Merch. Energy LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego Super. Ct.
filed Dec. 13,2000) (EI Paso). Erin Bennett & Polin a Melamed.
13. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Pa.
1999). Richard Kilsheimer.
14. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F.
Supp. 530 (C.D. Ill. 1996). Michael Freed.
15. In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL
22358491 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2003). Norman Hawker.
16. Scott Brooks, Microsoft and IBM Resolve Antitrust Issues,
IBM, July 1, 2005 http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/
pressrelease/7767.wss. Erika Dahlstrom.
17. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal.
1989), revJd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), affd sub nom, Hartford
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Maarten Burggraaf.
18. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. (Linerboard I), No. 1261,
2000 WL 1475559, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2000); In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig. (Linerboard II), 203 F.R.D. 197, 20104 (E.D.Pa. 2001), affd, In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.
(Linerboard III), 305 F.3d 145, 147-49 (3d Cir. 2002); In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Maarten Burggraaf.
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19. In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. ll90
(N.D. Ill. 1996). Maarten Burggraaf.
20. In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D.
428 (E.D. Pa. 2004). Michael Einhorn.
21. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 894 F.
Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Maarten Burggraaf.
22. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 902 F. Supp. 1394
(D. Kan. 1995), affd, 134 F.3d 1010 (lOth Cir. 1998). Joey Pulver.
23. Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action
Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2002). Andrew
Smullian.
24. N. Shore Hematology & Oncology Assocs. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 04 cv248 (EGS) (D.D.C. filed Feb.
13,2004). Tara Shoemaker.
25. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex.
1999). Stratis Camatsos.
26. Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 266 F.
Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2003). Tara Shoemaker.
27. Stop & Shop Supermarket Corp. v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., Civil Action No. 03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 6,2003);
Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2003 WL 302352 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 23, 2003). Tara Shoemaker.
28. In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d
1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Drew Stevens.
29. Settlement Agreement, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., No. JFM-04-968, M.D.L. Docket No. 1332 (D. Md. Oct.
11, 2005). Norman Hawker.
30. Red Eagle Res. v. Baker Hughes Inc. (In re Drill Bits
Antitrust Litig.), No. 4:91cv00627 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. ll, 1991).
Ruthie Linzer.
31. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass.
2004). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom.
32. In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27013 (D.N.I. Nov. 9, 2005). Morgan Anderson & Erika
Dahlstrom.
33. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1366
(J.P.M.L.). Ruthie Linzer.
34. In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2002 WL
31655191 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15,2002). Joey Pulver.
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35. Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir.
2003). Robert Lande.
36. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp.
2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom.
37. Setdement Agreement, Transam. Refining Corp. v. Dravo
Corp., No. 4:88CV00789 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 10, 1988) (Specialty
Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation). Ruthie Linzer.
38. In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan.
2005). Bobby Gordon.
39. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. & MasterCard Int'l
Inc., 396 F.3d 96,114 (2d Cir. 2005). Robert Lande.
40. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. (many related cases), see John
M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Cartel, (April 9, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3
/papers.cfm?abstracCid=885968.
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